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It seems likely that the need for protection against private claims for damages will cause more
corporations to notify the Commission of their agreements and practices so as to obtain exemptions
or, if appropriate, negative clearances. Whether this will cause a net increase in the Commission’s
workload is not clear, since there will be a concomitant decrease in the number of cases dealt with
by the Commission. The Commission could try to solve any problem of increasing workload by
proposing a directive to harmonize national laws and procedures in a way which would encourage
plaintiffs to bring claims in national courts rather than to the Commission, and by adopting or
proposing a directive to harmonize national laws and procedures in a way which would encourage
plaintiffs to bring claims in national courts rather than to the Commission, and by adopting or
proposing the adoption of group exemptions under article 85(3) for less restrictive agreements.
EEC COMPETITION ACTIONS IN MEMBER
STATES' COURTS-CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES,
DECLARATIONS AND INJUNCTIONS FOR
BREACH OF COMMUNITY ANTITRUST LAW
John Temple Lang*
I. PART I
A. Authorities Showing That Claims for Compensation and
Injunctions for Breach of Community Antitrust Law Can Now
Be Brought in National Courts
1. The Case Law of the Court of Justice
The question whether national laws should give a right to an
injunction or compensation or both in appropriate cases for loss
caused by an infringement of articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of
Rome1 (Treaty or EEC Treaty) has not come directly before the
Court of Justice of the European Communities. Case law, however,
provides some clear indications of the Court's likely position on the
question.
The leading case on the constitutional law of the European
Economic Community (EEC or Community) and the nature of the
Community legal system is N. V. Algemene Transport-en Expeditie
Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Netherlands Fiscal Administra-
tion,2 in which the Court, speaking of the rights of individuals
under Community law, wrote:
These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by
the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty
Legal Adviser, Legal Service of the Commission of the European Communities,
Brussels; Solicitor, Republic of Ireland; Visting Lecturer, Trinity College, Dublin. A version
of this article will appear in 1983 FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE, ANTITRUST AND
TRADE POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (B. Hawk ed. 1984), published by
Matthew Bender Company. Opinions expressed are purely personal, but I am greatly in-
debted to Christopher Vajda, of the English Bar, for his valuable comments on a draft of this
paper.
1. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 85, 86,
298 U.N.T.S. 3, 47-49 (unofficial English translation), 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-
II) (official English translation). [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
2. 1963 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8008.
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imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as
upon the Member States and upon the Institutions of the Com-
munity .... [t]he vigilance of individuals to protect their rights
amounts to an effective supervision in addition to the supervision
entrusted by Articles 169 and 170 to the diligence of the Com-
mission and of Member States. 3
In Belgische Radio en Televisie v. SV SABAM, 4 a case that con-
cerned the powers of national courts to decide the lawfulness of
certain contracts under articles 85 and 86, the Court said:
As the prohibitions of Article 85(1) and 86 tend by their very
nature to produce direct effects in relations between individuals,
these Articles create direct rights in respect of the individuals
concerned which the national courts must safeguard. To deny,
by virtue of the afore-mentioned Article 9 [of Regulation 17/62],
the national courts' jurisdiction to afford this safeguard, would
mean depriving individuals of rights which they hold under the
Treaty itself. 5
In the same case Advocate General Mayras said:
[W]here civil or commercial courts ...have to judge disputes
between individuals. . . the Court has only to give a decision on
the civil consequences of that infringement: nullity or termina-
tion of the contract, grant of damages to the injured party ...
[I]t is true that private persons can invoke the rights which they
hold by virtue of Articles 85 and 86 before their national courts
and that the latter have power to recognise their enjoyment of
them .... 6
In a case involving the duties under article 86 of an Italian televi-
sion monopoly, the Court said, "[e]ven within the framework of
Article 90, therefore, the prohibitions of Article 86 have direct
effect and confer on interested parties rights which the national
courts must safeguard." 7
3. Id. at 12-13, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8008, at
7214-15.
4. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 51, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP'. (CCH)
8268.
5. Id. at 62-63, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8268, at 9185-22.
6. Id. at 72-74, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8268, at 9185-29
to 9185-31.
7. Ex parte Sacchi, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 409, 430, [1974 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8267, at 9185-4.
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In a case concerning the lawfulness of selective distribution
agreements,8 the Court expressly referred to the holding in SABAM
and relied on the language in that opinion.9
In Camera Care Ltd. v. Commission,'0 the Court held that the
Commission had power to adopt interim or interlocutory decisions
to preserve the status quo during its administrative procedure "in
cases proved to be urgent in order to avoid a situation likely to cause
serious and irreparable damage to the party seeking their adoption
or which is intolerable in the public interest."" The fact that this is
a power to be used to prevent serious and irreparable damage to a
complainant company or individual demonstrates that articles 85
and 86 are laws for the protection of private persons and firms and
private interests, and not solely laws for the protection of the public
interest or the Community.
In a case concerned with the recovery of taxes which had been
imposed by a member state contrary to a directly applicable rule of
Community law,' 2 the Court said:
It follows from the judgments of 16 December 1976 in the
REWE and Comet cases (Case 33/76 and Case 45/76 (1976)
ECR 1989 and 2043 respectively) that, applying the principle of
cooperation laid down in Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, it is the
courts of the Member States which are entrusted with ensuring
the legal protection which subjects derive from the direct effect
of the provisions of Community law. In the present state of
Community law and in the absence of Community rules con-
cerning the contesting or the recovery of national charges which
have been unlawfully demanded or wrongfully levied, it is for
the domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the
courts having jurisdiction and determine the procedural condi-
tions governing actions at law intended to safeguard the rights
which subjects derive from the direct effect of Community law,
it being understood that such conditions cannot be less favoura-
ble than those relating to similar actions of a domestic nature
and that under no circumstances may they be so adapted as to
8. Anne Marty S.A. v. Est6e Lauder S.A., 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2481, [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8713.
9. Id. at 2501, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8713, at 8573.
10. 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 119, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8645.
11. Id. at 131, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8645, at 7644.
12. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. MIRECO S.A.S., 1980 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 2559, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8694.
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make it impossible in practice to exercise the rights which the
national courts have a duty to protect .... 13
This judgment illustrates that national courts have a duty to pro-
vide effective remedies in accordance with national law rules on
procedure for loss due to any infringement of Community law.
Since the whole range of national remedies must be made available
to a plaintiff suing for breach of Community law, actions for
declarations must be permitted where national law provides for
them. However, the two principal remedies in practice will be
damages and injunctions.
2. National laws
In 1966, the Commission published a study on the remedies
provided by national law for losses caused by infringements of
articles 85 and 86.14 The study dealt only with the then six member
states of the Community. It considered the right to compensation,
injunctions and enforcement of injunctions by astreintes (periodic
penalty payments) and publication of judgments.
The study was detailed and it does not seem appropriate to
paraphrase it here. The authors concluded that all forms of private
remedies were available under all the national laws.15 The only
point on which some doubt was expressed, a point of special signifi-
cance in German and Dutch law, was whether articles 85 and 86
should be regarded as laws for the protection of individuals and
private interests.' 6 It is submitted that this question has been an-
swered by the Court's judgments referred to above, and by the
judgments of the national courts discussed below.
The Commission has not updated the 1966 study, and no
comparable official study of the laws of the four new member states
(Denmark, Greece, Ireland and the United Kingdom) has been
published. However, it is possible to say certain things about the
national laws of some of the new member states.
13. Id. at 2574-75, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8694, at
8318-19.
14. La reparation des consequences dommageables d'une violation des articles 85 et 86





According to the national laws of Ireland, Scotland17and En-
gland, an action may be brought for an injunction or damages, as
may be appropriate, for breach of a statutory duty. This is possible
if the proper interpretation of the statute is that it is not merely a
law for the protection of the public interest, but rather is also
intended to protect, and provide a remedy for, private plaintiffs.
This same issue arises under Dutch and German law, and should be
answered in the same way: articles 85 and 86 are laws for the
protection of individual interests as well as for the protection of the
public interest. The Court's judgment in the Camera Care case, 18
the judgments of the Bundesgerichtshof in the BMW case,' 9 and of
the House of Lords in Garden Cottage Foods v. Milk Marketing
Board20 make that clear. That general language of the Court
quoted above, to the effect that articles 85 and 86 create rights
which national courts must safeguard, could hardly be explained on
the basis that these rights can be pleaded only by defendants and
not by plaintiffs.
Since it is now clear that an action for breach of statutory duty
may be brought, the alternative possibilities are mentioned only for
completeness. Moreover, the action for breach of a statutory duty
appears to correspond most closely to the rights of action in the
other member states in which the law seems fairly clear. These
latter rights of action are, in essence, a claim for loss caused by an
unlawful act. According to French law, for example, the well-
developed case law interpreting articles 1382 and 1383 of the Civil
Code, all infringements of law constitute faults sufficient to give
rise to delictual (tortious) liability, provided the law encompasses
individual interests as well as the general interest. 2' Before the
Garden Cottage Foods case discussed below, some lawyers had
thought that no action for breach of statutory duty would lie for a
violation of articles 85 and 86 because Regulation 1722 provided an
alternative remedy by way of complaint to the injured party. 23 The
Garden Cottage Foods judgment seems to show that this argument
17. For a discussion of Scottish law, see W. GLOAC & R. HENDERSON, INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 488-89 (8th ed. 1980); D. WALKER, CIVIL REMEDIES ch. 59 (1974).
18. 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 119, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8645.
19. Judgment of Oct. 23, 1979, Bundesgerichshof, W. Ger., 1980 Wirtschaftrecht 392.
20. [1983] 2 All E.R. 770 (H.L.).
21. CODE CsVIL [C. civ.] arts. 1382, 1383 (83e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1983) (Fr.).
22. Regulation 17, 5 J.O. COMM. EUR. 204 (1962).
23. Id.
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has been rejected by the House of Lords in the United Kingdom. It
is submitted that this is correct: Regulation 17 gives no right to
compensation or any other remedy for an injury suffered prior to
the date of the Commission's decision.
The laws of Ireland, Scotland and England apparently allow
an action to be brought for conspiracy to cause harm by unlawful
means. 24 This action would apply to infringements of article 85,
which are always committed by two or more enterprises; but it
would not normally apply to infringements of article 86 in which
only one enterprise is normally involved. Furthermore, even if
more than one enterprise were involved, article 86 would not apply
if the parties did not enter into an agreement-a necessary element
for an action in conspiracy. Nevertheless, a plaintiff might have
difficulty if the principal purpose of the unlawful agreement was,
for example, a patent license or a joint venture, and the loss caused
to him was only an incidental result of the agreement. In the case of
a collective boycott, however, or any exclusive agreement, no diffi-
culty would seem to arise because the exclusion of the plaintiff
would be a direct and necessary result of the agreement.
"Causing loss by unlawful means" may also be a tort, which
would encompass a loss caused by infringement of either article 85
or 86.
In Application de Gaz v. Falks Veritas,2 5 the possibility of
regarding infringements of articles 85 and 86 as a new kind of tort
was raised judicially in the United Kingdom.
Yet another possibility is that, where appropriate legislation
so provides, compensation, rather than an injunction may be
awarded. 28
In Ireland, it seems probable that the Constitution requires the
courts to give rights of action for injunctions or damages even
where a right has been infringed (such as a constitutional right or a
right under Community law) for which no other recognized right of
action exists.27
24. See, e.g., Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd. v. Gardner,, [1968] 2 Q.B. 762; Brekkes
Ltd. v. Cattel, 1971 All E.R. 1031 (Ch. 1970).
25. [1974] 3 All E.R. 51, 58 (C.A.).
26. See, e.g., The United Kingdom Supreme Court Act, 1981, § 50. For the Irish Law,
see B. MCMAHON & W. BINCHY, IRISH LAW OF TORTS 592-94 (1981).
27. O'Brien v. Keogh, 1978 Ir. R. 144; Meskell v. Coras lompair Eireann, 1973 Ir. R.
121, 132-33 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Byrne v. Ireland, 1972 Ir. R. 241, 279 (Sup. Ct. 1971);
Macauley v. Minister for Posts and Tels., 1966 Ir. R. 345.
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3. Case Law of National Courts
The relevant case law of national courts consists of eight re-
ported cases from five countries, of which all but two were decided
since the autumn of 1979. The decisions suggest that claims can be
made in national courts.
The most recent, and perhaps the most important of the na-
tional court cases, is Garden Cottage Foods Ltd. v. Milk Marketing
Board, decided by the House of Lords in the United Kingdom in
June 1983.28 The Milk Board revised its market arrangements and
decided to appoint only four distributors to export butter in bulk
from the United Kingdom, thereby cutting off supplies to Garden
Cottage Foods. Garden Cottage Foods claimed a violation of article
86 and a breach of statutory duty, and sued for an injunction
requiring the Board to resume supplies.
There was substantial argument as to whether it was possible
to assert a claim for damages. The trial judge decided that the
parties could make such a claim and thereby receive adequate
relief. 29 The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in
refusing to issue an injunction solely because each member of the
court felt doubt, in varying degrees, on the question whether dam-
ages could be awarded.30 Sir Sebag Shaw expressed considerable
misgivings as to whether a remedy in damages lies for a contraven-
tion of article 86 of the Treaty. 3' Lord Denning M.R. thought that
it was not altogether certain. 32 May L.J., though less doubtful than
the Master of the Rolls as to the availability of a remedy in dam-
ages, considered that the contrary was certainly arguable. 33 The
Court of Appeal therefore granted an injunction.
The House of Lords decided that the Court of Appeal should
not issue an injunction because appellate courts should not interfere
with the trial judge's discretion, and because it is not "seriously
arguable" that a remedy in damages is unavailable. 34 The case
really focused on the powers of appellate courts, but Lord Diplock,
speaking for a 4 to 1 majority, said:
28. Garden Cottage Foods Ltd. v. Milk Mktg. Bd., [1983] 2 All E.R. 770 (H.L.).
29. Id. at 772.




34. Id. at 778-79, 780.
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[Article 86] was held by the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Communities in Belgische Radio en Televisie v SABAM
Case 127/73 [1974] ECR 51 at 62 to produce direct effects in
relations between individuals and to create direct rights in re-
spect of the individuals concerned which the national courts
must protect. This decision of the Court of Justice as to the effect
of art. 86 is one which S 3(1) of the European Communities Act
1972 requires your Lordships to follow. The rights which the
article confers on citizens in the United Kingdom accordingly
fall within S 2(1) of the 1972 Act. They are without further
enactment to be given legal effect in the United Kingdom and
enforced accordingly.
A breach of the duty imposed by art. 86 not to abuse a
dominant position in the Common Market or in a substantial
part of it can thus be categorised in English law as a breach of a
statutory duty that is imposed not only for the purpose of pro-
moting the general economic prosperity of the Common Market
but also for the benefit of private individuals to whom loss or
damage is caused by a breach of that duty.
[I]n the light (a) of the uniform jurisprudence of the [Euro-
pean Court of Justice,] of which it is sufficient to mention the
Belgische Radio case (which I have already cited) and the subse-
quent case of Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG v Landwirtschaftkammer
fuir das Saarland Case 33/76 [1976] ECR 1989, which was to the
same effect as respect the duty of national courts to protect
rights conferred on individual citizens by directly applicable
provisions of the treaty, and (b) of S 2(1) and 3(1) of the Euro-
pean Communities Act 1972, I, for my own part, find it difficult
to see how it can ultimately be successfully argued, as the board
will seek to do, that a contravention of art. 86 which causes
damage to an individual citizen does not give rise to a cause of
action in English law of the nature of a cause of action for
breach of statutory duty; but since it cannot be regarded as
unarguable that is not a matter for final decision by your Lord-
ships at the interlocutory stage that the instant case has
reached. 35
Dissenting on the procedural issues, and favoring the grant of
an injunction, Lord Wilberforce said:
It can I think be accepted that a private person can sue in this
country to prevent an infraction of article 86. This follows from
35. Id. at 775, 777.
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the fact, which is indisputable, that this article is directly appli-
cable in member states. The Court of Justice of the European
Communities has moreover decided in Belgische Radio en Tele-
vise v SV SABAM Case 127/73 [1974] ECR 51 at 62, para. 16, in
connection with art. 86 that it is for the national courts of
member states to safeguard the rights of individuals. Since art.
86 says that abuses of a dominant position are prohibited, and
since prohibited conduct in England is sanctioned by an injunc-
tion, it would seem to follow that an action lies, at the instance
of a private person, for an injunction to restrain the prohibited
conduct. But can he recover damages? Your Lordships, I under-
stand, regard the contrary as "unarguable" or indeed "quite
unarguable," a bold proposition in the fact (sic) of doubts ex-
pressed by the learned Lords Justices and one whose confidence I
do not share. So far as the Community is concerned, art. 86 is
enforced under Regulation 17/27 February 1962 by orders to
desist (art. 3), and if necessary by fines (art. 15), and the Court
of Justice has similar powers on review. Fines are not payable to
persons injured by the prohibited conduct, and there is no way
under Community law by which such persons can get damages.
So the question is whether the situation is changed, and the
remedy extended, by the incorporation of art. 86 into our law by
S 2 of the European Communities Act 1972. To say that thereby
what is prohibited action becomes a tort or a "breach of statu-
tory duty" is, in my opinion, a conclusionary statement conceal-
ing a vital and unexpressed step. All that S 2 says (relevantly) is
that rights arising under the EEC Treaty are to be available in
law in the United Kingdom, but this does not suggest any trans-
formation or enlargement in their character. Indeed the section
calls them "enforceable Community rights," not rights arising
under United Kingdom law. All that the relevant cases (Rewe-
Zentralfinanz eG v Landwirtschaftskammer fir das Saarland
Case 33/76 [1976] ECR 1989 and Amministrazione delle Finanze
dello Stato v Sas Mediterranea Importazione, Rappresentanze,
Esportazione, Commercio (MIRECO) Case 826/79 [1980] ECR
2559) tell us is that it is for national laws to designate the
appropriate courts having jurisdiction, and to establish the pre-
cedural conditions. Does this enable national laws to define the
remedy? There is of course nothing illogical or even unusual in a
situation in which a person's rights extend to an injunction but
not to damages; many such exist in English law. Community
law, which is what the English court would be applying, is, in
any case, sui generis and the wording used in art. 86, "prohib-
ited" and "so far as it may affect trade between Member States,"
suggest that this may be such a case, the purpose of this article in
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the treaty being, so far as necessary, to stop such practices
continuing. No doubt there are arguments the other way; I am
certainly not contending for reverse unarguability, but I regret
that this House should take a position on this point, which was
only skeletally argued in an interlocutory proceeding. It seems to
me, with respect, and I am supported by Lord Denning MR, to
deserve consideration in greater depth, and, if I may invoke
American Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd. [1975] I All ER 504 at
510, [1975] AC 396 at 407 the court should not in an interlocu-
tory proceeding "decide difficult questions of law which call for
detailed argument and mature consideration."
If this is right, and the company's right to damages is an
uncertain one, that would be, in itself, a strong ground for not
leaving the company to recover hypothetical damages at the
trial but for granting an injunction. But I will now consider the
position on the assumption that such a right to damages does
exist. Should the company be left to this claim? There are here
two relevant considerations. In the first place, there can be no
doubt that the primary remedy against a prohibited act is an
injunction against continuance of it.3"
To summarize therefore, a majority of the House of Lords has
declared that it is not "seriously arguable" that the right to damages
does not exist for a breach of article 86, and a unanimous Court of
Appeal has issued an injunction for a breach of that article. There is
nothing in the reasoning of either court to limit the conclusions to
article 86, or to the United Kingdom. In spite of the procedural
complexities of the case, one may reasonably conclude that national
courts of EEC member states may award both compensation and
injunctions in appropriate cases for breaches of articles 85, 86 and
90.
In an earlier English High Court case, an ex parte interlocu-
tory injunction was granted to restrain British Sugar from refusing
to supply, contrary to article 86. 3 7
Less recent than, but just as important as, the Garden Cottage
Foods case is the judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof in the BMW
36. Id. at 783-84.
37. See James Budgett & Sons Ltd. v. British Sugar Corp., 1979 Eur. L. Rev. 417.
Under the British Resale Prices Act, 1976, § 35(3), breach of certain provisions of that Act on
restrictive prices rise to civil liability for breach of statutory duty; see also Chelmkarn Motors
Ltd. v. Esso Petroleum Co., 1979 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 73 (1978).
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case in 1979.38 The plaintiff imported BMW cars into Germany
from Belgium where they were cheaper. The defendant (the BMW
company in Belgium) instructed its Belgian dealers not to supply
the plaintiff-a clear violation of article 85. The Bundesgerichtshof
held that the plaintiff could recover damages, stating:
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty does not, of course, confer on a
person whose freedom to compete has been affected by an agree-
ment prohibited under that provision the right to institute civil
proceedings. However, like Article 1 of the Law Prohibiting
Unfair Competition, Article 85 of the EEC Treaty must be
considered a law for the protection of the injured party within
the meaning of Article 823(2) of the Civil Code at all events
where the prohibited impairment of the freedom to compete-in
this case the supply ban-is aimed directly at the person con-
cerned (citations omitted). Consequently, the principles em-
bodied in Article 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure apply to
local, and hence international, jurisdiction also with regard to
such actions....
The aim manifest in the defendant's conduct must also be
deemed to have helped bring about circumstances that consti-
tute the above-mentioned restrictions on competition. Neither a
boycott nor an infringement of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty
giving rise to the payment of damages can be held to exist
without the measure being intended to affect adversely the com-
petitive situation of a specific competitor. In the present case,
the aim of the measures taken by the defendant was, as the
appeal court found, to isolate the plaintiff from its Belgian
suppliers and hence to influence its competitive position on the
domestic market.3 9
As discussed below, this judgment appears to imply that ac-
cording to German law, a breach of article 85 would not give rise to
a claim for damages unless the unlawful conduct is anticompetitive
and directed against a specific victim. This would suggest that
exploitative (as distinct from anticompetitive) 40 conduct contrary to
38. Judgment of Oct. 23, 1979, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 1980 Wirtschaftrecht 392.
In the Commission study, supra note 14, it was concluded that compensation would be
available under German law only if the plaintiff were excluded from the Common Market or
from an important part of it. Id. at 24.
39. Judgment of Oct. 23, 1979, Bundesgerichtshof, W. Ger., 1980 Wirtschaftrecht 392
(unofficial translation).
40. Temple Lang, Some Aspects of Abuse of Dominant Positions in European Commu-
nity Antitrust Law, 3 FORDHAM INT'L L.F. 1, 18-36 (1979).
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article 86 might not be actionable, and that, for example, a price
fixing agreement not directed at a particular victim but against
consumers generally might not be actionable either. There is noth-
ing in the Treaty which would make either of these results necessary
or appropriate, so that if indeed they are the position in Germany,
they are due to the rules of German law, and one would not
necessarily expect the same limitations to be found elsewhere.
What judges take for granted is often as well established as law
which is debated at length by litigants. In Cadbury Ireland Ltd. v.
Kerry Cooperative,4' the plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled
to buy large quantities of milk from the defendants on the basis of
certain contracts, and claimed damages for breach of article 86
because of defendant's refusal to supply at a satisfactory price. The
judge rejected the claim under article 86, on the ground that the
facts did not constitute an infringement of article 86. However, the
court assumed without question that if an infringement had been
committed, damages would have been available as a remedy. 42
Two Belgian court decisions have arrived at similar results.
The first case was decided in 1964. 43 Three firms agreed to combine
their tug boat operations in the port of Antwerp in order to elimi-
nate price and other competition between them and establish a
virtual monopoly. They also agreed to give favorable prices to
customers who agreed to deal only with them. A fourth corporation
subsequently entered the market, and during court proceedings
asserted that the agreement to charge higher prices to its customers
was contrary to articles 85 and 86. The court ordered the three
firms to cease their discriminatory pricing agreement and awarded
damages against them. 44
In the second Belgian case, 45 decided in 1979, the court
granted an injunction on the basis that a price fixing agreement was
contrary to article 85. The court ordered several Belgian publishers
to refrain from making the supply of books to the plaintiff super-
markets dependent on the plaintiffs' promises to fix prices. 41
41. See 1981 Dublin U.L.J. 94.
42. Id. at 94-99.
43. Union de Remorquage et de Sauvetage v. Schelde Sleepvaartbedrijf, 1964 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 251.
44. Id.
45. GB-INNO-BM v. Elsevier-Sequoia, 29 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 258 (1980), discussed in
Kon, Article 85, Para. 3; A Case for Application by National Courts, 19 COMMON MKT. L.
REv. 541, 558-59 (1982).
46. 29 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 258, 265 (1980).
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The Regional Court in Amsterdam has granted preliminary
injunctions in two recent cases. 47 In 1979, the court ordered re-
sumption of certain supplies when it appeared that the defendant
had infringed article 86. The exclusive importer of French-lan-
guage newspapers into the Netherlands, owned by the French firm
Hachette, was prohibited from terminating supplies to a distribu-
tor, even for the purpose of distributing them itself. 4
4. Attitude of the Commission
In reply to a question in the European Parliament in 1973, the
Commission said that it considered that "actions for damages
brought by injured customers against firms that have violated Arti-
cles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty could provide useful support for
[the Commission's] own measures to combat such infringements.- 4
In a number of cases before the Court of Justice in which the
question has arisen incidentally, the Commission has submitted in
written argument that individuals and firms may claim compensa-
tion or injunctions in national courts for infringements of articles 85
and 86.
The Commission's statement to the parties in the Camera Care
procedure, after the judgment already cited, is a general statement
of the policy which the Commission intended to adopt in exercising
its powers to order interim measures. In this statement the Commis-
sion said: "[I]n general parties should consider whether a similar
remedy may not be available from a national court before applying
to the Commission-particularly if the national procedures are
cheaper or the order more easily policed. '" 50
All of this clearly implies that the Commission believes that
plaintiffs have remedies in national courts, and that in each case the
circumstances must be evaluated to determine whether a national
court can give a satisfactory remedy.5 '
47. Van Gelderen Import v. Impressum Nederland, 1981 Nederlandse Jurisprudentie
405; see also Brinkhof v. Nederlandse Spoorwegen, 1970 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 264 (preliminary
injunction granted).
48. Van Gelderen Import v. Impressum Nederland, 1981 Nederlandse Jurisprudentie
405.
49. 26 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 67) 54 (1983) (reply to question 519/72 from Mr.
Vredeling).
50. C. KERSE, EEC ANTITRUST PaocEsurE 322 app. 1 (1981).
51. See Temple Lang, The Powers of the Commission to Order Interim Measures in
Competition Cases, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 49, 58-59 (1981). Paines says that the Com-
1984]
402 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:389
A draft opinion of a section of the Economic and Social Com-
mittee on the Commission's Twelfth Report on Competition Policy
in July 1983 said:
It would be desirable to recommend to complainants (corpora-
tions and/or importers injured, consumers' associations, trade
unions) to apply to the administrations and/or the courts for
Member States .... The Commission should .... take steps to
publicise the national remedies available for individual plaintiffs
(firms, workers, consumers etc.) where Community competition
law is breached. If need be, the Commission should frame pro-
posals to ensure effective and uniform implementation of Com-
munity competition legislation by all national courts.5 2
5. Books and Law Review Articles
Many of the published comments addressing the question
whether national courts can award damages and injunctions were
either written before, or fail to discuss, the most important judg-
ments on the point, which were reduced in 1979 and subsequent
years. In spite of this, a majority of writers favor a right of action,
although showing more caution than is necessary or appropriate
now as a result of the judgments above . 3
mission's power to order interim measures is "almost a dead letter" because, in his view, the
failure to exhaust national remedies would be a sufficient reason for the Commission to refuse
a request for interim measures. Paines, Enforcing EEC Competition Law in English Courts,
1983 LAW Soc's GAZErTrE 272. This has never been said by the Commission in its statement in
Camera Care or elsewhere and there are some circumstances at least in which a national
court could not give an adequate remedy-e.g., if an injunction was needed in more than one
member state. See Temple Lang, Community Antitrust Law-Compliance and Enforce-
ment, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 335, 344-50, 352-54 (1981); infra notes 61-78. The Commis-
sion's first interim decision was adopted in 1982, Distribution system of Ford-Werke AG,
O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 256) 20 (1982), and its second in 1983, ECS/AKZO interim
measures, O.J. Eun. COMM. (No. L. 252) 13 (1983).
52. COMM'N OF THE EuR. COMMS., TWELFTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY (1983).
53. See, e.g., D. BAROUNOS, D. HALL & J. JAMES, EEC ANTITRUST LAW 135 (1975); C.
BELLAMY & C. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 107-08 (2d ed. 1978); J.
CUNNINGHAM, THE FAIR TRADING ACT 1973 at 416-17 (1974); DE Roux & VOILLEMOT, LE
DROIT DE LA CONCURRENCE DES COMMUNAUTES EUROPEENENS 244-47 (1976); A. GLEISS, COM-
MON MARKET CARTEL LAW 441-43 (3d ed. 1978); J. GUYENOT & C. D'EVEGNEE, EUROPEAN
ANTITRUST LAW OF THE COMMON MAmEr 159, 172, 305 (1976); C. KERSE, EEC ANTITRUST
PROCEDURE 266-77 (1981); B. McMAHON & W. BINCHY, IRISH LAW OF TORTS 9 (1981); E.
MESTMACKER, EUROPAISCHES WETTBEWERBSBRECHT 569 (1974); R. PLAISANT, R. FRANCES-
CHELLI & J. LAISSIER, DROIT EUROPiEN DE LA CONCURRENCE 324 (1978); J. SALMOND, LAW OF
TORTs 37 (17th ed. 1977); J. TEMPLE LANG, THE COMMON MARKET AND COMMON LAW 474-82
(1966); U. ToEPKE, EEC COMPETITION LAW 22, 681, 806 (1982); THIESING-SCHROTER-HOCH-
BAUM, LES ENTENTES Er LES POSITIONS DOMINANTES DANS LE DROIT DE LA CEE 111, 133-36,
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6. Practice
A number of claims for substantial sums in damages have been
settled, without publicity, in the last few years. It is likely that
there are a number of cases that resulted in unreported settlements.
However, no statistics are available. Some companies have applied
for exemptions under article 85(3) primarily or exclusively to ensure
that they could not be liable to pay compensation to anyone injured
as a result of their activities. There are also some companies that
take into account contingent liabilities to pay damages when for-
mulating and auditing their annual accounts.
B. Considerations of Legal Principle and of Policy
Articles 85 and 86 are directly applicable and create rights and
duties on which national courts must act. Logically, this must mean
that firms and individuals injured as a result of infringements of
articles 85 and 86 have a right to sue, and not merely that agree-
ments which are contrary to those articles are invalid and unen-
forceable. Moreover, articles 85 and 86 in their entirety are directly
applicable, not merely article 85(2). Articles 85 and 86 can be used,
in appropriate cases, as defenses. For example, it can always be
pleaded in an action on a contract that the contract is void under
article 85(2) or unlawful under article 86. There is no rational basis
for saying that the articles can be used only by defendants and not
by plaintiffs, unless it is thought that the articles are not laws for
the protection of individual interests. For the reasons given above,
251-52, 456 (1977); J. VAN DAMME, LE POLITIQUE DE LA CONCURRENCE DANS LA C.E.E. 290-
92 (1980); M. WAELBROECK, 4 LE DROIT DE LA COMMUNAUTt ECONOMIQUE EUROPEENNE 107
(1972); Emmerich, in Immenga/Mestmacker, GWB, Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbes-
chraunkungen, Kommentar 1283-1309, 1312-13 (1981); Grehan, EEC and Irish Competition
Policy and Law, 1983 RABELS ZEITSCHRIFr 22, 57-62; Huntley, The Protection of Trading
Interests Act 1980: Some Jurisdictional Aspects of Enforcement of Antitrust Laws, 30 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 213, 218-21 (1981); Jacobs, Jurisdiction and Enforcement in EEC Competition
Cases, in id. at 204, 213-15; Paines, supra note 51; Rew, Actions for Damages by Third
Parties under English Law for Breach of Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, 8 COMMON MKT. L.
REv. 462 (1971); Staines, The Right to Sue in Ireland for Violation of EEC Rules on
Competition, 2 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION 53 (1977); Temple Lang, Community
Antitrust Law-Compliance and Enforcement, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 335 (1981);
Toepke, Schadensersatz bei EWG-Kartelluerstossen, 5 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALER WIRTS-
CHArr 279 (1976); Warner, Panel Discussion, reprinted in ENTERPRISE LAW OF THE 80's, at
232-33 (F. Rowe, F. Jacobs & M. Joelson eds. 1980).
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and on the basis of other indications in Community antitrust law,54
it seems clear that articles 85 and 86 do protect individual interests.
They can therefore be used either as a shield or as a sword.
It is sometimes said that Community antitrust law is for the
protection of competition, not of competitors, and in principle this
is true. Nevertheless, the two aims are not mutually exclusive, and
the statement should not be used to exclude the possibility of claims
for damages by competitors in appropriate cases, just as in United
States antitrust law. 55
54. Certain provisions of the Community Regulations dealing with competition cases
protect the rights of enterprises injured by suspected violations of articles 85 and 86, and so
suggest that those articles are intended to protect those rights. These provisions are:
1. Regulation 17, article 3(2) (b): natural or legal persons who claim a legitimate interest
may apply to the Commission to ask for a finding that there has been an infringement of
articles 85 and 86, and to ask the Commission to bring it to an end, Regulation 17, art.
3(2)(b), 5 J.O. COMM. EuR. 205-06 (1962).
2. Regulation 17, article 19(2), gives natural or legal persons who show a sufficient interest a
right to be heard by the Commission. See also Regulation 99, arts. 5, 7, 6 J.O. Comm.
EUn. 2263 (1963); Id. art. 19(2), 5 J.O. COMM. EUR. 210.
3. Regulation 17, article 19(3), obliges the Commission, when it proposes to make a decision
favorable to the enterprises which are parties to the agreement or behavior in question, to
invite all interested third parties to submit their observations, Regulation 17, art. 19(3),
J.0. COMM. EuR. 210.
4. Regulation 99/63 obliges the Commission, when it considers that there are insufficient
grounds for a complaint under article 3(2) of Regulation 17, to inform the complainants of
its reasons and give them an opportunity to submit further comments in writing, Regula-
tion 99, 6 J.O. COMM. Eu. 2263 (1963).
5. Regulation 19, article 7 allows any natural or legal person claiming a legitimate interest to
ask the Commission to withdraw the benefit of a regulation adopted in accordance with
Regulation 19, i.e. a group exemption under article 85(3), Regulation 19, art. 7, 6 J.O.
COMM. EuR. 2263 (1963).
See also Regulation 1629, art. 1, 12 J.O. COMM. EUn. (No. L 209) 1 (1969); Regulation 1630,
arts. 5, 6, 7, 12 J.O. COMM. EUn. (No. L 209) 11 (1969) (transport regulations); Regulation
1017, arts. 10, 11, 26, 11 J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. L 175) 1 (1968); Regulation 26, art. 2(3), 5
J.O. COMM. EuR. 62 (1962) (agriculture regulation).
There have been a number of cases under articles 85 and 86 before the Court that
involved directly or indirectly the protection of the interests of enterprises which were injured
by the violation of those articles. Some important examples are Hugin Kassaregister A.B. v.
Commission; 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1869, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8524; Tepea B.V. v. Commission, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1391, [1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8467; United Brands Co. v. Commis-
sion, 1978 E. Comm Ct. J. Rep. 207, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. RF'.
(CCH) 8429; Commercial Solvents Corp. v. Commission, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep 223,
[1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. RiP. (CCH) 8209. The most important example,
already mentioned, is Camera Care Ltd. v. Commission, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 119,
[1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8645. There have been, of course,
many decisions of the Commission which involved the interests of third parties who were
injured by violations of Community competition law.
55. Temple Lang, EEC Competition Policies: A Status Report, in ENTEMPIaSE LAW OF
THE 80's, 18, 35-37 (F. Rowe, F. Jacobs & M. Joelson eds. 1980).
EEC COMPETITION ACTIONS
If either damages or an injunction are available, in appropri-
ate cases, for infringement of articles 85 and 86, there does not
appear to be any basis in Community law for the contention that
the other remedy should not be available. The Court has said that
although Community law has not introduced any new procedures
into national law, the whole range of the existing remedies under
national laws must be available to any plaintiff relying on a Com-
munity law rule having direct effects.56
Article 5 of the EEC Treaty obliges member states, including
the courts of member states, to "take all appropriate measures,
whether general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obliga-
tions arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the
institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate the achieve-
ment of the Community's tasks .... .,,5 This includes a duty to
protect the rights of individuals and firms under directly applicable
rules of Community law, and a duty to help the Commission
enforce Community law against enterprises which infringe it, pro-
vided that there is no risk of conflicting decisions.5 8
Clearly the Court generally favors the recognition of rights
under Community law in national courts, and favors the enforce-
ment by national courts of those rights. Articles 85 and 86 are
among the few articles of the Treaty which impose duties on private
corporations rather than state authorities. Since claims for injunc-
tions and damages can be made against the state for breach of
56. REWE v. Hauptzollamt Kiel, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1805, [1979-1981 Trans-
fer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP'. (CCH) 8766; Lee v. Minister for Agriculture, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1495, 1508, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8676; See also Garden Cottage Foods Ltd. v. Milk Mktg. Bd., [1983] 2 All E.R. 770 (H.L.).
57. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5(2).
58. Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, [1967-1970
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8056. In Lord Bethell v. SABENA, a judg-
ment of the High Court in England dated June 14, 1983, Mr. Justice Parker said that it was
not appropriate to ask the Court of Justice whether articles 85 and 86 oblige member states to
provide a remedy whereby the rights of individuals under those articles may be adequately
enforced. He said that if the state has not provided a remedy, there is none. Even if the
failure to provide the remedy is a breach of the state's obligations, that fact cannot affect a
plaintiff's rights. With respect, that opinion ignores the fact that the obligation to provide a
remedy for a breach of a directly applicable rule of Community law is itself directly
applicable, and so binds national courts without any need for implementing national legisla-
tion. Even in the absence of such legislation, therefore, a national court could and should
grant the full range of remedies given by national law, in appropriate cases. The view
expressed by Mr. Justice Parker is inappropriately dualist.
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Community law, a fortiori they can also be made against private
corporations.
The Commission has an interest in encouraging actions in
national courts to enforce articles 85 and 86, and indeed to enforce
Community law generally. The Commission is short of staff, and
has many important duties in addition to enforcing articles 85 and
86 in individual cases. Some article 85 and 86 cases are of relatively
little economic importance, however vital they may be to the par-
ties involved.
Since the Commission has no power to award damages, a
claim for damages made in a national court in contrast to a com-
plaint to the Commission avoids duplication of proceedings and is
likely to be more economical from a societal viewpoint. Private
antitrust actions would ensure that cases which could be properly
litigated in the national courts are so litigated. Accordingly, the
Commission would be free to concentrate on large, important or
difficult cases.
Companies that are aware they can be successfully sued for
damages for antitrust infringements by their competitors or cus-
tomers are more likely to comply voluntarily with Community law
than if they only risked possible fines imposed by the Commission.
The risk of having to fight claims for compensation or injunctions
will discourage firms from behavior the lawfulness of which is
doubtful. It would also discourage the practice of continuing with
an obvious violation until the Commission puts an end to it.
In short, more frequent claims in national courts for damages
and injunctions in antitrust cases would decentralize the enforce-
ment of Community antitrust law, and make it more effective. 9
59. Temple Lang, Antitrust Law in the European Community-Division of Powers,
Cambridge Lectures Canadian Institute for Advanced Legal Studies (1983); Temple Lang,
Compliance with the Common Market's Antitrust Law, 14 INT'L LAW. 485, 488-89 (1980).
In the EEC antitrust claims are for single damages, not treble damages as in the United
States. Nevertheless some facts and comments on the significance of treble damage actions in
the United States are of interest for comparison. By 1978 between 94% and 96% of all U.S.
antitrust cases filed each year were private actions, NAT'L ECON. RESEARCH Assoc., A
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE ANTITRUST LITIGATION: FINAL REPORT (1979), although
many of these were based on suits previously brought by the government. United States
courts have described treble damage actions as "a bulwark of antitrust enforcement." Perma
Life Mufflers v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968); See also Illinois Brick
Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 755 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (a paramount role in the
enforcement of the fundamental economic policy). See generally H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION (1954); NEALE, THE ANTITRUST
LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 396 (2d ed. 1970) ("[t]he fear of treble damage actions is one of the most
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C. Why Have There Not Been More Claims?
Although a majority of European lawyers appear to believe
that claims in national courts are possible, relatively few have been
brought. This may be partly due to mere caution. Attorneys and
their clients were probably reluctant to assert such claims until
someone else had successfully done so. There are, however, more
important reasons:
1. multiple damage actions do not exist in the EEC;
2. contingent fees do not exist in the EEC, and even successful
plaintiffs do not always recover their lawyers' fees from the
defendant;
3. class actions are far less common, and can be brought in much
more limited circumstances than in the United States;
4. it is less expensive and easier to complain to the Commission
under the very simple procedure under article 3 of Regulation 17
than to bring proceedings in a national court. The Commission
has more specialized knowledge of Community antitrust law
than most national courts, and has Community-wide powers to
gather evidence. The Commission is regarded as a forum which
is sympathetic to complainants;
5. a Commission decision, or even Commission action commencing
an investigation or a procedure against the defendant company,
would give the plaintiff considerable help in obtaining a favor-
able settlement of a claim for damages;
6. in England, the defendants' right to refuse to produce self-
incriminating documents in discovery proceedings may make it
potent influences in securing compliance with antitrust"); KAYSEN & TURNER, ANTITRUST
POLICY 257 (1959) ("private suits are.., the most effective way of policing the multitude of
comparatively local and insignificant violations that will tend to escape the glance of federal
enforcement authorities, or that even if noticed do not merit the expenditure of limited
enforcement resources"); 1955 DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REP'ORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NA-
TIONAL COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS ch. 8, at 380 ("[t]he private suit has
become an increasingly important method of enforcing the antitrust laws"); ABA ANTITRUST
SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENT 254 (1975): A REVIEW OF RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRAC-
TICES POLICY, CMO. 7512, at (1979) (calls treble damage actions "a notably powerful provi-
sion." "The treble damage has exceeded its architects' wildest expectations as an aid to
governmental enforcement, with over 1400 such suits having been commenced in 1978 as
compared to 228 in 1960. Close to 3000 of such cases are presently pending in the federal
courts"); Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1427 (1978) (private enforce-
ment is "[tjhe strongest pillar of antitrust,"); Loevinger, Private Action- The Strongest Pillar
of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST BULL. 167 (1958); OECD, MARKET POWER AND THE LAW 164-68
(1970).
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difficult for plaintiffs to get the evidence they need in claims
under articles 85 and 86;60
7. no parens patriae claims for damages seem to be possible under
the laws of any of the EEC member states;
8. private claims for injunctions and damages for breach of na-
tional antitrust laws are not common. It is felt that antitrust is
best left to specialized tribunals.
Nevertheless, it seems likely that in a number of cases the
defendants have made settlements in order to avoid publicity and
other claims by potential plaintiffs similarly placed, so that the
number of claims made may be greater than appears in the law
reports.
II. PART II
A. Complaints to the Commission as an Aid in Obtaining Compen-
sation in a National Court: the Rights of a Complainant
Article 3 of Regulation 17 gives individuals and corporations
claiming a "legitimate interest" a right to complain to the Commis-
sion if they believe that there has been in infringement of articles 85
or 86.1 Any corporation which had or was likely to have a claim for
damages or for an injunction in a national court would have a
"legitimate interest." If the Commission thinks it appropriate, the
complaint is investigated, and if the Commission decides to begin a
formal procedure, a statement of objections is sent to the corpora-
tions against whom the complaint is made.
Article 6 of Regulation 99/63 says that if the Commission
considers that, on the information in its possession, there are insuffi-
cient grounds for accepting the complaints, it must inform the
complainants of its reasons, and fix a time within which they may
comment .62
In GEMA v. Commission,"3 the Commission had written a
letter in accordance with article 6, explaining why it considered
there were insufficient grounds for the complaint. The Court held
60. In re Westinghouse Uranium Contract, 1978 A.C. 547; see British Leyland v. Wyatt
Interpart, 1979 F.S.R. 583; Philip, 1981 LEGAL IssuEs EUR. INTEGRATION 49. On this point it
seems that a plaintiff in an English court may have fewer rights to obtain compulsory
disclosure of documents than a plaintiff in courts of other member states.
61. Regulation 17, art. 3, 5 J.O. COMM. Eua. 204, 205-06 (1962).
62. Regulation 99, art. 6, 6 J.O. COMM. Eua. 2263 (1963).
63. 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3173, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8568.
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that the Commission had not failed to act, since the letter was
sufficient to define the Commission's position for the purposes of
article 175, and since a complainant is not entitled to obtain a
formal decision on the existence of the infringement.6 4
It seems clear that a complainant may use article 175 if neces-
sary in order to obtain the letter required by article 6 of Regulation
99. It also seems clear that such a letter is not a decision, and
therefore cannot be challenged under article 173.5 Whether there
is a right to pursue the matter once the complainant has replied to
such a letter is less clear.
In Lord Bethel v. Commission,°6 another letter which substan-
tially rejected a complaint was challenged. The Court held that
since article 175 entitles an applicant to obtain only an act ad-
dressed to him, it does not entitle a complainant to go before the
Court on the ground that the Commission has not adopted mea-
sures addressed to the parties to the alleged infringement.6 7
It seems, therefore, that after the complainant has been given
a chance to reply to an article 6 letter, it generally has no right to
insist on obtaining a formal decision which it can appeal, even if
the complaint has not been accepted.
The complainant, however, apparently may go before the
Court if the Commission adopts a decision addressed to the parties
to the agreement or practice complained of and such decision per-
tains to the substance of the complaint. In Metro SB Grossmdrkte
GmbH v. Commission,"8 Metro complained about the distribution
agreements of another firm. The Commission adopted a decision
addressed to the parties to the agreements that exempted the agree-
64. Id. at 3189-91, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8568, at
8255-58.
65. Temple Lang, Community Antitrust Law-Compliance and Enforcement, 18
COMMON MKT. L. REv. 335, 346 (1981). Cf. Regulation 1017, art. 11(3), 11 J.O. COMM.
EUR. (No. L 175) 1 (1968). The defendant in a claim for damages would probably be able to
compel the plaintiff to produce any letter written under article 6 and such a letter would
almost certainly be helpful to the defendant, although of course it would not be binding on
the national court. However, a defendant who relied on this rule might bring down a
Commission investigation on his head.
66. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2277, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8858.
67. Id. at 2290-91, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8858, at
8101-03.
68. 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, 1901, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8435, at 7848.
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ments under article 85(3).69 The Court said that Metrohad standing
to challenge the validity of the decision under article 173. In doing
so, the Court used words which now seem too broad, in light of the
later judgments in the GEMA and Lord Bethell cases. It said that
complainants "should be able, if their request is not complied with
either wholly or in part, to institute proceedings in order to protect
their legitimate interests. '70 These words seem applicable only
when a decision has been adopted by the Commission, although the
complainant has no right to compel the Commission to do so.
The Commission adopted a practice that if a complainant
requests a decision on his complaint, in sufficiently serious or im-
portant cases, a decision addressed to the complainant will be
adopted, which he can then challenge under article 173, if the
conditions of that article are fulfilled. 71 This was accomplished in
Demo Studio Schmidt v. Commission.72 The plaintiff complained
to the Commission about the refusal of the Revox firm to admit him
into its distribution system. The Commission, in a letter stating "its
final position," gave reasons and rejected the complaint.7 3 The
plaintiff then applied to the Court to have the rejection annulled.
The Advocate General pointed out that the letter was to be re-
garded, in content and in form, as a decision and that the Commis-
sion regarded it as a decision and not as a mere "administrative
letter. ' 74 The Advocate General, based on broad arguments about
the need for judicial control and the Metro-Grossmirkte judgment,
concluded that the challenge to the letter was admissible because
it constituted a decision addressed to the plaintiff. 75 The Court
agreed. 76
It seems, therefore, that the Commission generally has a le-
gally enforceable duty to act on a complaint, and that if it does not
do so it can be obliged only to write a letter explaining why, in its
69. Id. at 1904, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8435, at
7851.
70. Id. at 1901, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8435, at
7848.
71. So stated by the Commission in Case 146/80, Armstrong Patents v. Commission
(later withdrawn and never decided).
72. Demo Studio Schmidt v. Commission, Case 210/81 (Oct. 11, 1983) (holding that the
application to challenge the decision was admissible, but rejecting it on its merits).
73. Id. at _ .
74. Id. at __ .
75. Id. at __ (opinion of Advocate General Rozes).
76. Id. at __ .
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opinion, there are insufficient grounds for accepting the complaint.
The Commission has never said that it would not accept a com-
plaint because it could be satisfactorily dealt with by a national
court, and it is not clear whether it would be entitled to refuse to
deal with a complaint on that ground.
Under most national laws a citizen or corporation has no
standing to sue a public authority that declines to act on a com-
plaint submitted to it, and there is no obvious reason why a com-
plainant should have standing in such circumstances under Com-
munity antitrust law. It seems reasonable that a complainant
should have no right to bring his complaint to the Court directly
under articles 173 or 175 when he can do so indirectly, by bringing
proceedings against the parties to the allegedly unlawful practice in
a national court. The national court may then refer a question of
Community law to the Court under article 177, if it is necessary to
do so, and the Commission will intervene before the Court as
amicus curiae. Alternatively, the national court itself may ask the
Commission to investigate the case further, if there is a compelling
reason to do so.
It is submitted that the Commission may, in appropriate cases,
decline to act on a complaint, even one which it thinks is well-
founded, if it could be adequately dealt with by a national court. If
this view is correct, a fortiori the Commission may properly decline
to deal with a complaint that could be dealt with by a national
court and that the Commission did not consider sound, without
rejecting the complaint in a formal, challengeable decision.
In other words, a complainant is not deprived of judicial
remedy if he fails to persuade the Commission to act on his com-
plaint, although he obtains it by a different procedure, through a
national court. Even though the administrative role of the Commis-
sion under Community law is more important than, for example,
the role of the Department of Justice in the United States (it is in
fact nearer to that of the Federal Trade Commission), the ultimate
control of EEC antitrust law is a judicial control. In a Community
based on the rule of law, this is as it should be.
This overall result is also satisfactory for another reason. If
both the Commission and the national courts enforce EEC antitrust
law, as they undoubtedly do, the Commission's role should be to
concentrate on cases which appear to be important to the Commu-
nity, or those that are not within the purview of one national court.
The roles of the Commission and national courts should comple-
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ment each other in a way which should lead to the most effective
and economical enforcement of EEC antitrust law. It would prob-
ably not be conducive to effective enforcement if the Commission
was compelled to litigate before the court every complaint that it
found unconvincing.
If the plaintiff is suffering serious losses and needs a temporary
injunction in several member states to protect him, he is not likely
to obtain a series of appropriate injunctions, in a reasonable time
and at a reasonable cost, from a series of national courts. Essen-
tially, only the Commission can help such a plaintiff satisfactorily.
It is therefore of interest that the Court in Camera Care77 appeared
to say that the Commission's refusal to use interim measures may
have to be in a form that could be challenged before the Court. For
the reasons just given, there might be a distinction between (1) cases
in which interim measures were requested (in which the Commis-
sion might have a duty to reject a request for interim measures by a
formal decision, so as to allow review by the Court, at least where
no single national court could deal satisfactorily with the matter),
and (2) cases in which no interim measures were requested and in
which the complainant could expect to be adequately protected by
a national court if he could prove his case (in which circumstance
the Commission would have no duty to adopt a rejection which the
complainant could challenge).
Because the law remains unclear, a well drafted complaint to
the Commission should explain, if appropriate, why the complain-
ant cannot expect a satisfactory remedy from a national court, or
_ why it is suggested that the case is of sufficient importance to justify
the Commission taking action. In due course, the complainant
should request a formal decision rejecting the complaint if the
Commission is inclined to reject it; and, if desired, should request
interim measures. A complaint of this type could be made simulta-
neously with proceedings in a national court if any such proceed-
ings seem useful. No doubt a well-advised complainant's lawyer
will also try to present the complaint in such a way that the
Commission will be pursuaded to make findings of fact or law that
are likely to be helpful to the complainant in later proceedings for
77. Camera Care Ltd. v. Commission, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 119, (1979-1981
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8645; see Temple Lang, The Powers of the
Commission to Order Interim Measures in Competition Cases, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 49
(1981).
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compensation in a national court. A complainant should also seek a
ruling to establish that it has a "legitimate interest" to safeguard its
position.
It is, however, clear that a complainant never needs to exhaust
national remedies before he complains to the Commission. 78
If the Commission acts on a complaint and the corporations
involved put an end to the agreement or practice complained of,
the Commission has no obligation to adopt a formal decision ruling
that it was unlawful, 79 even though such a decision would be
helpful to the complainant in a later claim for damages.
A complainant whose complaint is pursued by the Commission
has essentially the same role, in the Commission's procedure, as an
intervenor who becomes involved in a case initiated by the Com-
mission or by a third party. As a matter of principle, the position of
a third party with interests adverse to those of the parties to the
agreement or practice being examined probably should not depend
on whether it has made a complaint or whether it has intervened in
a procedure begun some other way. The position of an intervenor is
discussed below.
B. What Complaints Can Be Dealt With Satisfactorily
Only By the Commission?
The Commission has never published an official policy state-
ment setting out its priorities as an antitrust enforcement authority.
It has repeatedly stated, however, that ending allocation and divi-
sion of markets is one of its principal objectives. Export bans and
other efforts to divide the EEC, however, are normally infringe-
ments which could be dealt with by the national courts in the
member state from which exports are being prevented. It has been
suggested that the Commission should give priority to the following
kinds of cases:
1. cases of economic importance, especially those involving hori-
zontal cartels, concentrated industries or basic raw materials,
and where profit levels in the industries appear to be high;
78. Merkur-Aussenhandels-GmbH v. Commission, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1055,
[1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8243.
79. Deutscher Komponistenverband e.V. v. Commission, 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
705, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8143.
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2. cases involving governments and state enterprises, which are less
likely to be satisfactorily dealt with by national cartel authorities
or by national courts;
3. under article 86, cases involving anticompetitive behavior
(rather than exploitative abuses) and in particular anticompeti-
tive behavior having long-term or structural effects, such as
mergers and joint ventures;
4. cases in which effective long-term remedies, especially structural
remedies, are likely to be possible if infringements are found to
have been committed.
In other words, it has been suggested that the Commission should
give priority to ensuring effective competition in the future.
Even if national laws on the rights of plaintiffs were clarified
and perhaps harmonized in the forseeable future, there will be
certain types of cases which cannot be satisfactorily dealt with by
national courts or national antitrust authorities. The Commission
would normally be a more appropriate forum than a national cartel
authority or a national court in the following situations:
1. if the corporations said to have infringed the Treaty were in two
or more member states, or if economic investigations, discovery
of documents or preliminary injunctions or other legal remedies
were needed throughout the Community or in several member
states;
2. if the interest of the Community in the case was substantially
greater than that of any one member state or than that of the
complainant;
3. in cases where the economic issues raised were difficult or the
final remedy needed was complex or far-reaching or needed to
be uniform or effective throughout the Community-for exam-
ple, cases involving the application of article 85 to air and water
transport;
4. in merger or joint venture cases where it is essential to have only
one decision in force, to avoid conflicting decisions at the na-
tional level, and because such cases may involve divestiture. If
divestiture in more than one member state is necessary, a deci-
sion of the Commission is needed; even if divestiture in only one
state is needed, it is still serious enough and difficult enough as a
remedy to justify the Commission dealing with it in most if not
all cases. In any case, the rules of procedure of national courts
do not now provide for procedures appropriate to divestiture;
5. in cases in which an exemption under article 85(3) was to be
given or had to be seriously considered, since only the Commis-
sion can give such a decision under Regulation 17;
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6. in cases involving governments, state enterprises and state mea-
sures;
7. in important test cases, where the economic issues might be
beyond the resources of an individual plaintiff to deal with
adequately (test cases are particularly important because class
actions are often impossible);
8. in cases where a Community fine is appropriate.
C. Interventions in Community Procedures by Potential Plaintiffs
Where the proceedings are before the Commission or the
Court, a potential plaintiff in a national court seeking damages or
an injunction may have an interest in intervening, whether or not it
has initiated the proceedings by a complaint,80 to try to get the
Commission or the Court to take a position helpful to it.
To make a complaint, a "legitimate interest" must be shown;
to be heard by the Commission as an intervenor, a "sufficient
interest" is needed.8' Article 93 of the Rules of Procedure of the
Court simply says that the intervenor must show his "interest. '8 2 No
significant difference between these phrases has emerged. It seems
that in general any direct and practical interest in the outcome of
the case is sufficient for all three purposes. A potential plaintiff who
alleges losses as the result of an unlawful agreement or practice and
requests compensation demonstrates a sufficient interest.
The Commission does not usually issue a formal ruling on
whether a corporation is entitled to complain or intervene as of
right. If it allows the intervention, the Commission is not obliged to
make a ruling on the question.83 However, a corporation wishing to
intervene should always make a formal request to do so and should
specify the basis for its "interest." A corporation which has com-
plained or intervened, having the right to do so, probably has
standing to challenge any later decision of the Commission pertain-
ing to the subject matter of the complaint or intervention, even if
the decision is not addressed to it. 84
80. Temple Lang, The Position of Third Parties in EEC Competition Cases, 1978 EuR.
L. Ray. 177.
81. Id. at 178-79, 182-84.
82. 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 39) 1, 22 (1982), 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 4843,
at 4043.
83. Deutscher Komponistenverband e.V. v. Commission, 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
705, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. RaP. (CCH) 8143.
84. Article 173 gives an intervenor a right to challenge the validity of a decision not
addressed to it only if the decision is "of direct and individual concern" to the intervenor.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 173. It seems that if a corporation has an interest sufficient to
1984]
416 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:389
If the Commission intends to adopt a decision favorable to the
corporations primarily involved in the agreement or practice, it
must publish a notice of its intention to do so in the Official Jour-
nal. 85 The same thing may (but need not) be done if an "adminis-
trative letter" to the corporations involved is intended to be sent.
The notice provides third parties, with interests adverse to those of
the corporations primarily involved, an opportunity to make sub-
missions. They may do so whether or not they have previously
complained.
If a third party has an interest sufficient to give it a right to
intervene in the Commission's procedure, the Commission must
provide the information necessary to enable the intervenor to
present its case. This obligation is subject only to prohibition
against disclosing the business secrets of the corporations primarily
involved.8 6 Thus, the intervenor must know what case the Commis-
sion is making, and what reply has been made by the corporations
primarily involved, if the Commission's view is adverse to them. In
each case, the intervenor needs to know the evidence relied on, in
order to present its case. Intervention may therefore put the inter-
venor in possession of extremely helpful documents that it would
not have otherwise obtained, or that it would not have obtained
without difficulty in discovery procedures. It seems that any docu-
ments that the Commission can properly give to an intervenor
during the Commission's procedure may be used by the intervenor
in later national proceedings. 87
The procedural rights of intervenors in the Commission's pro-
ceedings are not entirely clear. In principle, it seems that if the
Commission did not give an intervenor the documents that it
needed to adequately present its case, or did not allow the interve-
nor adequate opportunity to make its arguments, the intervenor
could challenge the validity of the Commission's final decision on
those grounds. 88 In practice, the Commission gives complainants
entitle it to intervene, the decision is likely to be "of direct and individual concern" to it, at
least in most cases.
85. Regulation 17, art. 19, 5 J.O. COMM. EUR. 204, 210 (1962).
86. See infra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
87. The Community law rules on business secrets limit the information which the
Commission may disclose. They do not seem to limit what private parties can do with
information properly disclosed by the Commission to them during the Commission's proce-
dure.
88. Article 19 of Regulation 17 and article 5 of Regulation 99 oblige the Commission to
give persons with a "sufficient interest" an opportunity to make known their views. Regula-
tion 99, art. 5, 6 J.O. COMM. Eua. 2263 (1963); Regulation 17, art. 19, 5 J.O. COMM. EvR.
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and intervenors a copy of the statement of objections sent to the
defendant, and makes available to them the documents in the
Commission's possession, excluding only material which the de-
fendant claims is protected by the rules on "business secrets." Prob-
lems might arise if it was important for the intervenor's case to
comment on the documents which the defendant said were "se-
cret." It seems, but is not clear, that if the defendant's documents
are within the definition of "business secrets," the intervenor has no
right to see them, despite their importance. The rules on business
secrets override the procedural rights of even a corporation with an
unquestionable right to intervene. However, even the business se-
crets rules are overridden by the defendant's rights when the Com-
mission needs to rely on the business secrets of an intervenor against
the defendant.8 However, it seems that the rules on business secrets
allow the purpose for which the documents are needed to be
weighed against the arguments for secrecy. A document considered
to be "secret" might have to be disclosed to the intervenor if it were
vitally important to do so. If the principal issue in a case is the
lawfulness of an agreement, the complainant certainly needs access
to that agreement. In appropriate cases, the difficulty could per-
haps be solved by disclosing an otherwise secret document to the
intervenor's lawyers on a "professional advisers only" basis. 90 It
seems that an intervenor could not challenge under article 173 of
the EEC Treaty a ruling by the Commission that defendants' docu-
ments were business secrets and could not be disclosed to the inter-
venor. 91 However, it is unlikely that an intervenor would make such
a challenge, as it would delay the Commission's procedure.
In order for a third party (complainant or intervenor) to have
the right to challenge before the Court a decision favorable to the
firms involved, it is helpful if the third party intervened in the
204, 210 (1962). This must necessarily imply that the intervenor is adequately informed about
the case on which he may wish to express views.
89. Hoffmann-LaRoche & Co. v. Commission, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 461, 510-
14, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. RERP. (CCH) 8527, at 7538-40; Musique
Diffusion Francaise S.A. v. Commission, Case Nos. 100/80 to 103/80, [1981-1983 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. RET'. (CCH) 8880; see Distillers Co. v. Commission, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2229, 2295-98, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP'. (CCH)
1 8613, at 7273-76.
90. See National Carbonising Co., 19 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 35) 6, 8-9 (1976).
91. IBM v. Commission, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2639, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REo'. (CCH) 8708. If an intervenor failed to challenge a ruling that he could
not see documents, he could probably argue in later proceedings to annul the Commission's
final decision that the refusal to disclose was a procedural fault serious enough to invalidate
the decision. It would always be difficult for an intervenor to prove that a document which
by definition he had not seen should not be regarded as really secret.
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Commission's procedure.9 2 If the Commission had ruled that such a
party had a right to intervene, it would be difficult to contest that
party's standing tc challenge the decision. It is not clear, however,
whether intervention in the Commission's procedure is a prerequi-
site for standing to challenge the decision under article 173. On the
one hand, the Regulations could not take away a right given by
article 173 to challenge any decision which is "of direct and individ-
ual concern" to the corporation wishing to challenge it. On the
other hand, it is clearly undesirable that a corporation should make
arguments for the first time before the Court that should have been
made during the Commission's procedure. The better view is that a
corporation wishing to claim its rights under article 173 must have
shown ordinary diligence in the earlier stages, since article 19 of
Regulation 17 is specifically designed to give third parties an oppor-
tunity to object before the Commission makes a decision,9 3 at a time
when any evidence they produce can be fully investigated. In the-
ory, if a corporation produced sufficiently persuasive arguments
before the Court that it had failed to produce earlier, the Commis-
sion might be led to withdraw its own decision, in which case the
corporation would have caused both the Commission and the par-
ties to the agreement or practice unnecessary expense and delay.
Therefore, firms that may suffer from agreements or practices
which the Commission proposes to approve would be wise to inter-
vene in the Commission's procedure when the Commission pub-
lishes a notice of its intention to grant a favorable ruling.
If the third party does not challenge the Commission's decision
before the Court, he is bound by it, provided it is a decision under
article 85(3) .94 If the decision is merely a negative clearance,95 it is
not formally binding on the third party if the latter can produce
new evidence. The third party, however, might be estopped from
producing such evidence if it were available to him at the time the
Commission published its notice and adopted its decision.
92. Metro Grossmarkte v. Commission, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8435.
93. Regulation 17, art. 19, 5 J.O. COMM. EUR. 204, 210 (1962).
94. Under article 189, decisions are binding on the parties to whom they are addressed,
which would not normally include a complainant or intervenor. However, if a complainant
or intervenor did not challenge a decision which it had a right to challenge under article 173,
it could not be heard to say later that the decision was invalid. If it could not challenge it
under article 173, it could not challenge it under article 184 either, since article 184 applies
only to regulations. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 173, 184, 189.
95. See infra text accompanying note 113.
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The potential plaintiff therefore, at least if it has complained
or intervened in the Commission's procedure, may have rights to go
before the Court in four different types of proceedings: 
9 6
1. in proceedings brought by the parties to the agreement or prac-
tice to annul a Commission decision wholly or partly unfavor-
able to them. In such a situation the potential plaintiff will
intervene on the side of the Commission in what would be in the
United States a government suit;
2. in proceedings brought by the potential plaintiff, to annul a
decision of the Commission favorable to the parties to the agree-
ment or practice. In such a case the latter can be expected to
intervene on the side of the Commission;
3. in proceedings brought by the potential plaintiff against the
Commission requiring it to "define its position" on the plaintiff's
complaint against a cartel or dominant corporation; again, the
parties to the alleged infringement may intervene on the Com-
mission's side;
4. in a case referred to the Court of Justice by a national court
under article 177 of the EEC Treaty, at least if the national
procedural rules allow the intervention.
96. The following are examples of Community antitrust cases before the Court in which
there have been interventions adverse to the interests of the corporations primarily involved.
IBM v. Commission, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1857, 2639, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8708; Camera Care Ltd. v. Commission, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 119, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8645; Distillers Co. V.
Commission, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2229, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8613; van Landewyck v. Commission, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3125,
[1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP,. (CCH) 8687; Miles Druce v. Commission,
1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1049; Tepea B.V. v. Commission, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
1391, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8467; Metro-Grossmarkte v.
Commission, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8435; National Carbonising v. Commission, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1193;
Groupement des Fabricants de Papiers Peints v. Commission, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
1491, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. Rio,. (CCH) 1 8335; Istituto Chemioterapico
Italiano S.p.A. v. Commission, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 357, [1974 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8209; Consten S.A. v. Commission, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 299, 382, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP'. (CCH) 8046, at 7684.
The following examples of interventions are of special interest, though not all concern
antitrust cases: Ford-Werke v. Commission, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3091; Societe
anonyme Generale Sucriere v. Commission, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1465 (both cases
involving interventions by consumer organizations): AM&S Eur. Ltd. v. Commission, 1982
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1575, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8757
(intervention by the Consultative Commission of the European Bars and Law Societies in a
case involving attorney-client privilege): Chris Int'l Foods v. Commission, cases 91/82 and
200/82 (intervention by non-Member States of the Community, the Commonwealth of
Dominica and other countries, in a case involving movement of Latin American bananas
within the EEC).
19841
420 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:389
III. SOME SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ABOUT
POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF COMMUNITY LAW
ON PRIVATE CLAIMS
A. Protection Against Claims: Defenses Given by Community Law
It has been concluded that claims for injunctions and damages
are possible in national courts for losses caused by infringements of
Community antitrust laws. Certain defenses are available under
rules of Community law (apart from any defenses are available
under national law) against such claims. They are:
(a) Legislative defenses:
(1) exemption or special treatment for the industry;
(2) group exemptions under article 85(3);




(3) efforts to influence state or community action;
(4) provisional validity.
1. Legislative defenses
There are Community measures that largely exempt certain
industries from the normal operations of articles 85 and 86, or that
provide special, less stringent treatment under those articles. The
most important exemptions under the EEC Treaty are for agricul-
ture and certain kinds of transport. 7 These exemptions are to be
construed strictly.Y8 In addition, there are legislative group exemp-
97. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 42, 48; Regulation 1630, 12 J.0. COMM. EuR.
(No. L 209) 11 (1969) (transport); Regulation 1629, 12 J.O. COmM. EuR. (No. L 209) 1
(1969); Regulation 1017, 11 J.O. COMM. EuR. (No. L 175) 1 (1968); Regulation 141, 5 J.0.
COMM. EuR. 2753 (1962); Regulation 26, 5 J.0. COMM. Eu's. 62 (1962) (agriculture).
98. See Nungesser v. Commission, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2015, 2058-60, [1981-
1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REo'. (CCH) 8805, at 7539-40; Cooperatieve Stremsel
en Kleurselfabriek v. Commission, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 851, 869-70, [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8709, at 8485-86; FRUBO v. Commission,
1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 563, 582-83, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REL'. (CCH)
1 8285, at 7271. As Commission decisions see also Cane Sugar, 23 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L
39) 64 (1980); Cauliflowers, 21 O.J. Eu'. COMM. (No. L 21) 23 (1978); Mushrooms, 18 O.J.
EuR. COMM. (No. L 29) 26 (1975).
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tions under article 85(3) that exempt from article 85(1) and 85(2),
without notification to the Commission, all agreements that come
within their terms."' If a defendant can show that his agreement
falls within the terms of such an exemption, the plaintiff could
succeed only if the benefit of the group exemption has been with-
drawn by the Commission from the agreement in question. This
can be done by individual decision if the particular agreement,
although falling within the terms of the group exemption, "has
effects which are incompatible with article 85(3)."100
National courts may apply and interpret Community legisla-
tion of these kinds, subject to article 177 of the EEC Treaty.' 0 ' In
other words, they decide whether the individual agreement fulfils
the requirement of the group exemption. In reaching a decision, the
national courts may consider the views expressed by the Commis-
sion or by Commission officials in correspondence as to the inter-
pretation or application of the legislation in question to the facts of
the particular case.
2. Defenses Given by Community Law in Individual Cases
a. Commission Action
Individual exemptions under article 85(3), negative clearances
and administrative letters are the kinds of Commission action that
need to be considered.
Under the explicit language of Regulation 17, only the Com-
mission can grant an exemption under article 85(3).102 A national
court cannot do so, even if the Commission has been notified of the
agreement or the agreement falls under article 4(2).103
A decision of the Commission granting an exemption under
article 85(3) for the period during which the infringement of article
99. These group exemptions may be adopted by the Commission under Regulation 19, 8
J.0. COMM. EUR. 533 (1965). Examples of group exemptions are Regulation 67, 10 J.0.
COMM EuR. 849 (1967) on exclusive dealer agreements (which has now expired and been
replaced by Regulation 1984, 26 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 173) 5 (1983)); Regulation 1983, 26
O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 173) 1 (1983); Regulation 2903, 20 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 338);
Regulation 2779, 15 J.0. COMM. Eun. (No. L 292) 23 (1972); Regulation 2743, 15 J.0.
COMM. EuR. (No. L. 291) 144 (1972); Regulation 2821, 14 J.0. COMM. EUR. (No. L 285) 46
(1971) on specialization agreements.
100. Regulation 19, art. 7, 8 J.0. COMM. EuR. 533, 535 (1965).
101. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177.
102. See Regulation 17, 5 J.0. COMM. Eua. 204 (1962).
103. See id.
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85(1) occurred is a complete defense to a claim for damages for that
loss, provided that the restrictive features of the agreement or
practice were adequately described in the notification. Such an
agreement is on balance beneficial. 0 4 It has been formally declared
to be lawful. Anyone injured by it would almost certainly have
standing to challenge the exemption decision under article 173 of
the EEC Treaty, and could intervene to oppose the granting of the
decision during the Commission's procedure.10 5 If they do not chal-
lenge the validity of the decision, it is in effect binding on them.
Since an exemption decision under article 85(3) is binding
unless successfully challenged, it seems that it would deprive a
plaintiff, suffering loss as a result of the agreement or practice, of its
right to sue even if the loss resulted directly from an abuse of the
exemption, 0 6 unless the exemption were to be revoked retroac-
tively.
If an agreement has been duly notified to the Commission, or
falls under article 4(2) of Regulation 17, an exemption which is
retroactive up to the date of notification can be given at any time,
even after loss has resulted and a claim has been made. 0 7 The
disadvantage, for the parties to the agreement, of relying on this is
the uncertainty as to whether the Commission will give the exemp-
tion for the agreement without requiring any amendments to it.
The Commission has always taken the position that an exemption
can be given only if all the clauses in the agreement can be ex-
empted in the circumstances in which they operate, so that one
unacceptable clause would make the whole agreement ineligible for
exemption unless the clause was amended or removed. 0 8 Even an
administrative letter saying that the whole agreement appeared to
be eligible for exemption could not bind the Commission to grant
such an exemption retroactively or at all. Moreover, there is always
104. See Consten S.A. v. Commission, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, [1961-1966
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046; Temple Lang, European Community
Antitrust Law and Joint Ventures Involving Transfer of Technology, in 1982 FORDHAM
CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 203, 245 (B. Hawk ed. 1983).
105. Regulation 99, arts. 5, 7, 6 J.O. COMM. Eun. 2263 (1963; Regulation 17, art. 19, 5
J.O. COMM. EuR. 210 (1962); Metro-Grossmarkte v. Commission, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1875, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8435; Temple Lang,
The Rights of Third Parties in EEC Competition Cases, 3 ERu. L. REV. 177 (1978).
106. Regulation 17, art. 8(3)(d), 5 J.O. COMM. EuR. 204, 207 (1962).
107. Regulation 17, art. 6, 5 J.O. COMM. EuR. 204, 206 (1962).
108. Id. art. 7.
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the possibility that an intervenor may produce evidence or argu-
ments that cause the Commission, or its officials, to take a wholly
different view of the case.
Even if an exemption is given, in many cases it cannot be given
for the period before the date of the notification, 10 9 and it seems
that an exemption does not prevent a claim for damages for any loss
by the agreement before notification, if the agreement were acted
upon before then.110 It is therefore important to notify the Commis-
sion of any agreements before they are acted upon, if there is any
risk that acting on them may cause loss to third parties. In some
circumstances it would be wise to notify the Commission of the
agreement even before it is signed, if the parties are likely to act on
it before then.
Under article 8 of Regulation 17, the Commission may revoke
an individual exemption under article 85(3), may amend it, or
prohibit specific acts."' However, this power has never been used.
A revocation, amendment or prohibition could, according to the
legislation, be retroactive if the exemption had been obtained by
deceit, was based on incorrect information, or was "abused," or if
the parties committed a breach of any obligation attached to the
exemption. The power could be invoked, without retroactive ef-
fect, if any of the facts pertinent to the granting of the exemption
are altered. In such a case, the defense to a claim by a third party
could be valid but subject to the effect of the later decision.
It is extremely important to stress that if the Commission has
not been notified of an agreement to which article 85(1) applies, the
fact that it is otherwise eligible for an exemption is irrelevant, and
the plaintiff can recover (unless the agreement falls under article
4(2) of Regulation 17). Thus, the position of a plaintiff is relatively
simple, much simpler than in a case under the rule of reason in
United States law. l l2 In effect, if the Commission has not been
109. Id. art. 6. But see id. art. 4.
110. See Musique Diffusion Francaise S.A. v. Commission, Case Nos. 100/80 to 103/80,
[1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8880; Temple Lang, Community
Antitrust Law-Compliance and Enforcement, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 335, 350-52
(1981); infra note 126.
111. Regulation 17, art. 8, 5 J.O. COMM. EuR. 204, 207 (1962).
112. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 173, 175 (1977) (rule of
reason). See also Hawk, EEC and U. S. Competition Policies-Contrast and Convergence, in
ENTERMRISE LAW OF THE 80's 39, 50 (F. Rowe, F. Jacobs & M. Joelson eds. 1980) (comparing
European and United States law).
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notified of the agreement, the defendant has accepted the risks
involved1 3 and the plaintiff has all the advantages of dealing with a
per se violation. It also means that it may be extremely important
for a potential plaintiff to discover, as soon as possible after filing
his complaint with the Commission, whether the Commission has
been notified of the agreement.
The notice to third parties in which the Commission is obliged
to announce its intention, subject to third parties' comments, of
granting favorable decision does not usually distinguish between an
exemption under article 85(3) and a negative clearance. A negative
clearance is also a formal decision, but one merely ruling that, on
the basis of the facts in the possession of the Commission, there are
no grounds under article 85(1) or article 86 that warrant Commis-
sion action."14 A negative clearance has a limited value in providing
legal security. It cannot prevent a private plaintiff from producing
additional evidence which was not before the Commission, at least
if circumstances changed or if facts emerged which had not been
known to the plaintiff at the time the Commission's notice was
published, or if the evidence concerns facts which occurred after
that time. A plaintiff might be estopped from producing evidence
in civil proceedings after a negative clearance was granted, in view
of the fact that he could have presented the information to the
Commission before the clearance was given. Such estoppel would
be a question of national law. A complainant cannot be estopped
from bringing facts to the attention of the Commission, since a
citizen cannot be estopped from informing a public authority of
facts that require the authority to enforce the law. It is also not
clear whether a negative clearance might be binding on a national
court in the absence of any new evidence, but the point is probably
academic; there will always be some new evidence. It seems to
follow that a negative clearance will always be helpful but is not an
absolute defense to a claim for compensation. The corporations
which notify the agreement to the Commission, therefore, have an
interest in getting an exemption rather than a negative clearance. It
also follows that a practice that might be thought to fall under
article 86 cannot receive an absolute defense from the Commission,
113. See Musique Diffusion, Case Nos. 100/80 to 103/80 [1981-1983 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8880.
114. Regulation 17, art. 2, 5 J.O. COMM. EUR. 204, 205 (1962).
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since such practice can only be the subject of a negative clearance-
there is nothing in article 86 corresponding to article 85(3).
In practice, however, some negative clearances are based on a
much more thorough explanation of the facts, and therefore on a
much more thorough consideration by the Commission, than oth-
ers. A thoroughly considered negative clearance would not likely be
reversed unless very significant change in the circumstances oc-
curred after it had been granted. Corporations seeking a negative
clearance, therefore, have an interest in making certain that the
facts (including any arguments for the application of article 85(1)
or article 86) are explained as fully as possible to the Commission.
They may also have an interest in ensuring that the Commission's
notice of its intention to grant a negative clearance, and the nega-
tive clearance itself, are as thorough and as broadly drafted as
possible, so as to maximize any available estoppel effect on poten-
tial plaintiffs.
A practice has been adopted by which the services of the
Commission (i.e. officials of the Commission not acting on the
authority of the Commission) issue "administrative letters" instead
of negative clearances or exemptions, provided the letters are satis-
factory to the parties to an agreement. The intent to issue such a
letter is now, in some cases, announced in a notice in the Official
Journal under circumstances somewhat similar to that which must
precede a negative clearance or an exemption. Since an administra-
tive letter is not a decision, it cannot bind any party. It is, however,
an expression of the opinion of Commission officials to which a
national court should give some weight. "5 It is not clear how much
extra weight should be given to such a letter as a result of prior
publication of a notice. Presumably, prior publication may create
the same kind of estoppel effect as a notice of a negative clearance.
It may well create less. Since a letter is not a decision and has no
binding effect on anyone (and could not be challenged before the
Court), a plaintiff might well argue that it had no obligation to
115. L'Oreal N.V. v. De Nieuwe A.M.C.K., 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3775, [1979-
1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8715; Lancome S.A. v. Etos B.V., 1980
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2511, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8714;
Marty v. Estee Lauder S.A., 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2481, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8713; Procureur de la Republique v. Giry, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 2327, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8712 (the "perfume"
cases).
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object to the writing of such a letter, and therefore was not in any
way estopped from later disputing any conclusion reached by the
official who signed it. The effect, if any, of such a letter, also
depends on whether it says that article 85(1) does not apply, or that
in the writer's opinion article 85(3) applies. If it said that article
85(1) does not apply, the national judge may, if he agrees, deal
with the matter. If, however, article 85(1) applies, the national
court has no power to give an exemption under article 85(3)116 or to
act as if an exemption had been given, and the parties must go back
to the Commission for an exemption. The Commission is not bound
by such a letter" 7 and is free to give or refuse an exemption later,
following the normal procedure. The writing of a letter does not
eliminate the corporations from the responsibility to notify the
agreement formally 8 and the exemption, if given, can be retroac-
tive only to the date of formal notification, even if the administra-
tive letter was written before that date. An administrative letter,
therefore, is not a defense in a claim for compensation.
b. State Action and Efforts to Influence State Action
Another possible defense which needs to be considered con-
cerns state action. Official action of any state that falls short of legal
compulsion cannot be a defense to an action for compensation,
although it might be a reason for mitigating a Commission fine.
One must next distinguish between action by a member state of the
European Community (or by a public authority of such a state) and
by a non-member state. The EEC Treaty has the effect of prohibit-
ing member states from adopting measures obliging, facilitating,
encouraging or purporting to authorize or approve any corporation
to infringe, inter alia, articles 85 and 86. "' Any such action, there-
116. Regulation 17, art. 9(1), 5 J.O. COMM. EUR. 204, 207 (1962).
117. FRUBO v. Commission, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 563, 582, [1975 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8285, at 7271. The fact that administrative letters are
not written on behalf of the Commission has recently been made more clear. A national judge
is not necessarily bound to adjourn proceedings merely because an exemption has been sought
for an agreement the validity of which is in issue before him, but he should do so if necessary
to avoid the risk of conflicting decisions. Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 1, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8056.
118. For a rather similar situation, see Distillers Co. v. Commission, 1980 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 2229, 2262-64, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8613,
at 7254-55.
119. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 5, 90; Openbaar Ministerie of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands v. van Tiggle, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 25, 47-48 (Advocate General
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fore, is an infringement of the Treaty by the member state, and the
corporation addressed can and should refuse to obey the measure in
question on this ground (unless the corporation has notified the
Commission of the practice and obtained an exemption in the
ordinary way). If the corporation obeys the unlawful measure and,
therefore, commits an infringement of article 85 or 86, it seems that
the state action, since it could not legalize the corporation's behav-
ior, cannot be a defense to a claim against the corporation for
compensation. It is true that the injured party might also have a
claim against the state. 120 But even if this were so, it would not
deprive the injured party of its claim against the corporation that
had, without valid authorization, infringed articles 85 and 86. The
defendant corporation might have a right to be indemnified by the
state in such circumstances.
In the case of compulsion (as distinct from non-binding pres-
sure) by a non-member state of the Community, it would be rea-
sonable to suppose that a defense would be available, if the measure
required the defendant to commit the antitrust violation.
The only other possible defense which needs to be considered
here is the defense of efforts to influence government or Commu-
nity action. It has been suggested that it is lawful under article 85
for enterprises to come together and collaborate in good faith for
the sole purpose of influencing government or Community action.
In other words, there is something like a Noerr-Pennington121 ex-
ception in Community law. Since the EEC is a democratic Com-
munity and fundamental rights principles are part of Community
law, 22 this is probably correct in a broad sense. However, even if it
is so, the exception would not apply if the government measure
Capotorti); G.B.-INNO-B.M. v. A.T.A.B., 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2115, [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8442; Waelbroeck, La Constitution euro-
peenne et les Interventions des Etats membres en matiere economique, in LIBEe AMICORUM
Pimr' VERLoRN VAN THEMAAT 331, 335 (1982).
120. See Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. MIRECO S.A.S., 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2559, 2574-75, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8694, at 8318-19. There would be a claim against the state only if the loss could be said to
have been caused by the state measure, which would be the case if the state had ordered an
infringement but not if it merely encouraged or approved it.
121. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R.
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
122. See, e.g., Levin D.M. v. Staatssecretaris, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J, Rep. 1035, [1981-
1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8821; Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz,
1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3727, 3744, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP'.
(CCH) 8629, at 7449; Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219,
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sought would itself infringe any rule of Community law, in particu-
lar article 90. Nor would it apply if the alleged campaign was
merely a disguise for a concerted effort to influence competitors'
behavior directly.
What may appear to be a state measure on, for example,
maximum or minimum prices or on restricting market entry, may
be merely the agreement of the undertakings involved "clad in the
formal garb of measures of public law. 1 23 If the state measure is in
reality governmental approval or adoption of a restrictive agree-
ment (or the result of a restrictive agreement) between enterprises,
without sufficiently thorough, independent and objective assess-
ment in the public interest, the state measure must be prohibited by
either article 90 or article 5. Such an agreement is a state-approved
cartel, and falls under article 85. The legality of a price fixing
agreement has nothing to do with whether the price fixed is reason-
able. There may be difficult problems in distinguishing between
individual lobbying and a coordinated attempt to get official sup-
port for a restrictive agreement. In addition, problems of evidence
may arise as to the extent to which a state authority has merely
"rubber stamped" the recommendation of a cartel, or of a domi-
nant state-owned or other privileged enterprise. If the regulated
enterprises suggest their own restrictive regulation and the state
authorities adopt it, both may violate Community law. The state
must often depend on the enterprises in question for information,
and may consult them before deciding on its own policy. However,
a state can always consult large enterprises individually and may
consult with trade associations (on facts, not on desiderata) only if
large numbers of small enterprises make this necessary. Member
states have a duty not to sacrifice Community law to administrative
convenience. 12 4
1232, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8322, at 7778; Nold v. Commis-
sion, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 491, 513; Einfuhr-und Vorratstelle v. Koster Beradt & Co.,
1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1161, 1174, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8127, at 7451; Internationale Handelgesellschaft MbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle
fur Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1125, 1146, [1971-1973 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8126, at 7418, 7433; see also National Panasonic (U.K.)
Ltd. v. Commission, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2033, 2056, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8682, at 8067; Prais v. Commission, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1589.
123. van Tiggele, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 25, 48 (Advocate General Capotorti).
124. DePeiiper, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 613, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8353.
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c. Provisional Validity
For completeness, the doctrine of provisional validity must be
mentioned. It applies only to agreements which were entered into
before the EEC rules became applicable to them. This may be
either in 1963 when Regulation 17 came into force or on the acces-
sion of one of the new member states to the Community, if the
Treaty became applicable because of accession (for example, be-
cause it caused the agreement for the first time to affect trade
between member states). Provisional validity also applies only if the
agreement was duly notified to the Commission within the appro-
priate time limit, or is exempt from the need to notify, and if the
Commission has not indicated that it is unlikely to give an exemp-
tion under article 85(3).125 If these conditions are fulfilled, a na-
tional court must treat the agreement provisionally as if it were
valid.
B. Protection Against Claims: Antitrust Compliance Programs
The adoption of a satisfactory and thorough antitrust compli-
ance program, if it is done on the corporation's own initiative and
before the Commission's procedure has begun, may be grounds for
reducing a fine.126 It cannot affect the amount of any compensation
payable, but the adoption of an effective program may ensure that
compensation is never paid. A program may also tend to show that
it was contrary to the corporation's policy to take part in restrictive
agreements. Furthermore, if genuine doubt existed as to whether a
particular corporation was a party to an antitrust violation, the fact
that it previously adopted an antitrust compliance program might
help to prove that it was not such a party.
From the corporation's point of view, antitrust compliance
programs are more necessary in Europe than in the United States,
because European businessmen are in general less aware of the risks
125. Vereniging des Boekhandels v. Eldi Records, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1137,
[1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8646; DeBloos v. Bouyer, 1977 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2359, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8444;
Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin & Janssen, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 77, [1971-1973
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. RFo. (CCH) 8170; Portelange S.A. v. Smith Corona
Marchant Int'l, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 309, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8075.
126. See National Panasonic, O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 354) 28 (1982).
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of violating antitrust laws. (From the individual businessman's
standpoint, compliance programs may be less necessary in Europe
than in the United States, because jail sentences are not imposed for
infringing Community law). Satisfactory compliance programs
may save auditors' fees as well as costs to the corporation in fines,
compensation and the time spent by executives investigating and
contesting claims and negotiating settlements. The scope and con-
tent of a Community antitrust law compliance program is in gen-
eral similar, but not identical to, a United States antitrust compli-
ance program. A United States program does not make a
Community program unnecessary. The main differences result
from the facts that:
1. Community law prohibits "exploitative" abuses; 127
2. Community law is stricter on territorial protection;
3. Community law causes certain antitrust consequences to result
from unilateral action; 128
4. Community antitrust law fines are often higher than fines under
United States antitrust law; 129
5. if no exemption has been sought, clauses in restrictive agree-
ments may be invalid as a result of article 85(2), even if the
agreement could have obtained an exemption under article
85(3). 130 Therefore, to ensure that an agreement is valid, it may
be essential to notify the Commission even if it appears certain
that the Commission will not object to it. This is important in
relation to joint ventures,13 ' patent and know-how licenses, 132
and other forms of cooperation, that in principle are entirely
legitimate, but that may include restrictive clauses;
127. See Temple Lang, supra note 40, at 18-31.
128. See Regulation 67, art. 3, 10 J.O. COMM. EUR. 849 (1967); Regulation 1983, art.
3(d), 26 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 173) 1 (1983); Ford, O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 256) 20
(1982); see also infra note 160.
129. See, e.g., Musique Diffusion, Case Nos. 100/80 to 103/80, [1981-1983 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8880.
130. See id., in which the court stressed that failure to notify is not omission of a mere
formality but the result of a deliberate choice of one kind of risk rather than another.
131. Temple Lang, European Community Antitrust Law and Joint Ventures Involving
Transfer of Technology, in 1982 FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE 203, 207, 215 (B.
Hawk ed. 1983).
132. See Johannes, Technology Transfer under EEC Law-Europe Between the Diver-
gent Opinions of the Past and the New Administration, in 1982 FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW
INSTITUTE 65 (B. Hawk ed. 1983).
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6. the threshold of dominance under article 86 is lower (i.e. more
corporations are "dominant") than the threshold of monopoly
under section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 133 This is so both
because article 86 applies to narrow markets 3 4 and because the
threshold of dominance involves lower market shares than in the
United States;
7. a European antitrust compliance program should deal with na-
tional antitrust laws as well as Community antitrust law.
A Community law antitrust compliance program, if it is prop-
erly drafted, should require the Commission to be notified of all
agreements which might fall, or might in changed circumstances
fall, under article 85(1). The program will also require an applica-
tion for negative clearance to protect the practices of dominant or
possibly dominant companies thought to violate article 86.135 Noti-
fication is often essential to ensure protection against claims for
damages.
C. Community Fines and Claims for Compensation
Fines may be imposed by the Commission for breach of articles
85 and 86 if the breach is intentional or negligent. 13 In appropriate
cases, these fines may reach 10% of the total turnover of the
corporation fined. In the case of a claim for damages or an injunc-
tion, the plaintiff would have to prove neither intent nor negli-
gence, unless either was a necessary element in an action for breach
of statutory duty or the equivalent under national law, which does
not seem to be the case.
The better view is that neither the likelihood of private claims
for compensation nor the amount of any compensation likely to be
133. See, e.g., Hoffman LaRoche & Co. v. Commission, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
461, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP,. (CCH) 8527.
134. Hugin Kassaregister AB v. Commission, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1869, [1978-
1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8524; B.P, v. Commission, 1978 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1513, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MK~r. REP. (CCH) 8465;
General Motors Continental v. Commission, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1367, [1975
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8320.
135. Hoffmann LaRoche & Co. v. Commission, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 461, [1978-
1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8527.
136. Regulation 17, art. 15(2), 5 J.O. COMM. EUR. 204, 209 (1962). See BMW (Bel-
gium) S.A. v. Commission, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2435, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder]
COMMON Mar. REP'. (CCH) 8548; Miller Int'l Schallplatten v. Commission, 1978 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 131, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. RaP. (CCH) 8439.
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awarded should affect the amount of any fine imposed by the
Commission. 13 7 The Commission believes that such damages can be
recovered in appropriate cases. Accordingly, fines imposed by the
Commission are based on the assumption that damages will be
payable. Compensation does not constitute a penalty, so the ques-
tion of a double penalty does not arise if a firm which infringes
articles 85 and 86 pays a fine as well as damages. Even if every
potential plaintiff sued (an extremely rare possibility), or if class
actions were possible, the aggregate loss to all the plaintiffs (which
would be the measure of the compensation) might be different from
the benefit to the defendants. The benefit, if it were measurable,
might indicate prima facie the minimum amount of the fine. Al-
though the analogy is not exact, criminal penalties under national
laws are not affected by the likelihood that compensation will also
be payable by the accused. In the United States, fines as well as
treble damages are imposed for antitrust violations. Treble dam-
ages by definition are partly punitive, and are recovered by persons
injured by antitrust violations. It is reasonable for corporations
engaging in deliberately unlawful behavior to pay a fine as well as
damages if they have caused losses to others. Only corporations that
act deliberately or negligently can be fined. Moreover, only those
that act deliberately are likely to be fined the full amount of the
profit they made, provided such figure may be accurately deter-
mined. This result is reasonable particularly because Community
antitrust law does not authorize fines on directors or executives
involved in antitrust violations (still less allow them to be put in jail
as in the United States). Indeed, since compensation by definition
cannot punish or deter if it is limited to loss actually caused to
others, fines should be in addition to, and not in lieu of, compensa-
tion.
It appears likely that claims for even single damages often
might be larger than the increased fines currently imposed by the
Commission in serious cases. The full amount of compensation will
be payable even if the violation is not a well-known or well-estab-
lished infringement, and even if the violation is not particularly
serious from the Community point of view.
137. The leading case on the fining policy of the Commission is Musique Diffusion, Case
Nos. 100/80 to 103/80, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8880. The
Commission is, however, obliged, when imposing fines, to take account of any fine imposed
under national antitrust law of a member state in respect of the same conduct.
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D. Interim Measures, "Serious and Irreparable Damage"
and Compensation in National Courts
The Commission has power to order interim measures (in
effect, preliminary injunctions) to prevent "serious and irreparable
damage" to the corporation requesting the measures during the
course of the Commission's procedure. 138 If compensation can be
obtained in national courts, the question arises what damage is
nevertheless "irreparable" and so justifies interim measures. While
the law is not yet clear, some comments may be useful.
If compensation would be available and would be an adequate
remedy, interim measures from the Commission are not necessary
for the protection of the complainant. In these circumstances, in-
terim measures would not be appropriate unless the Community's
interest in adopting them is separate from the interest of the com-
plainant. At least in the majority of cases, the public or Community
interests in protecting competition cannot be adequately compen-
sated by damages.
Nevertheless, it may be that interim measures should be or-
dered if the balance of all the interests involved is such that they are
preferable to subsequent damages. The interests to be considered
include those of the complainant and the corporation said to be
infringing Community antitrust law, the interests of third parties
(customers or suppliers of either party and consumers), and the
general public or Community interest. The Court did not say in the
Camera Care case that the Commission should balance these inter-
ests, but it appears that the Court itself balances them in exercising
its own powers. 139 It may be that neither the Community interest
nor the complainant's interest would by itself necessitate interim
measures. However, if both the Community and the complainant
would benefit from interim measures, such measures could be or-
dered even if damages would be available to the complainant and
other injured parties in similar positions. Since class actions for
damages are generally not possible under the national laws of mem-
138. Camera Care Ltd. v. Commission, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 119, [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8645; C. KERsE, EEC ANTITRUST PROCEDURE
125-30 & app. 1 (1981); Temple Lang, The Powers of the Commission to Order Interim
Measures in Competition Cases, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 49 (1981).
139. See Camera Care, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 119, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8645.
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ber states, interim measures may be preferable to a series of actions
in national courts.
The fact that in given circumstances the Commission is not
obliged to adopt interim measures does not necessarily prevent the
national courts from adopting them. The national law rules govern-
ing the issuance of preliminary injunctions are not necessarily iden-
tical to the Community law rules. (No doubt the Court will look at
rules of national law for guidance, but those rules are different in
each member state).
If it is clear that damages are not available to the complainant
in the national courts and if the conditions for interim measures are
otherwise fulfilled, the Commission should adopt them. This might
occur even if the national courts in question should award damages,
for example, even if it could be shown that their failure to do so was
a breach of the duties of the member state in question to protect
private rights under directly applicable rules of Community law.
More difficult questions arise if damages may be awarded by
the appropriate national courts, but are not an adequate or a
satisfactory remedy for the injury suffered by the complainant. The
most common example of this is where the allegedly unlawful
conduct prevents the complainant from carrying on a particular
line of business. It is often impossible to calculate the loss of business
the complainant has suffered, the profits it would have made from
that business, or the amount of goodwill it would have acquired for
the future. It is therefore impossible to calculate how much com-
pensation should be awarded. This is a significant reason for the
imposition of interim measures. Most national courts would award
preliminary injunctions in these circumstances, and it is submitted
that the Commission may also do so. If the complainant will cease
trading, or will be unable to enter the market, without the imposi-
tion of interim measures, such measures are required. In addition,
if the complainant posts a bond to protect the defendant corpora-
tion from loss if interim measures are awarded but the defendant
ultimately wins the case, such protection favors the use of interim
measures.140 It may also be important that a new market is opening
up and that the complainant should not be excluded from it at the
140. National Carbonising, 18 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 35) 6 (1975); National Car-
bonising Co. v. Commission, 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1193; Temple Lang, L'afjaire
National Carbonising, 1977 CAHlERS DE DROIT EUROPEEN 506.
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crucial formative stage, even if it could subsequently enter provided
the claim was successful. 141 It would also be an argument for the
adoption of interim measures by the Commission that the latter had
obtained important evidence in favor of the complainant that was
not already in the possession of the complainant.
If it is clear that a preliminary injunction would be available
from a national court and would be an entirely satisfactory remedy,
it is submitted that the Commission is not obliged to adopt interim
measures.
E. The Duties of National Courts in Private Claims for
Breach of Community Antitrust Law
When a national court hears a private claim for an injunction
or damages for breach of Community antitrust law, it is obliged not
only to grant the plaintiff the relief it requests, insofar as the relief is
appropriate, but also to ensure compliance with Community law.
This seems to be a reasonable deduction from article 5 of the EEC
Treaty and from the Court's decision in Walt Wilhelm v. Bun-
deskartellamt. 142  Community law is public law and public policy,
and the national court must address any issue arising under Com-
munity law even if the parties do not. A national court may dis-
charge its duty by sending the papers to the Commission, or to the
national antitrust authority that is also responsible for enforcing
Community antitrust law.143 It may refer a question of Community
141. This argument was strongly made in a case which was finally settled without a
formal decision. See IGR Stereo Television-Salora, COMM'N. OF THE EuR. COMMUNriiES,
ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLIcy 63-64 (1982). In that case there was a patent
controlled by and licensed to all the German stereo television producers, who had decided to
grant licenses to nonmembers of the patent-owning corporation only after a certain date and
for a limited number of receiving sets. The complainant, a Finnish manufacturer (Salora),
was therefore refused a license until after the first wave of consumer purchases of the new
stereo television sets was over. After it had complained to the Commission, Salora was
granted a license by the holders of the patent. See id. This is one of the EEC's antitrust
bottleneck monopoly cases.
In cases where interim measures are needed to allow a new competitor onto the market,
it is submitted that they are justified, if the other conditions are fulfilled, to restore the status
quo, if the status quo before the infringement was that new competitors could enter the
market.
142. 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8056.
143. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5; Regulation 17, art. 9, 5 J.0. COMM. EuR. 204,
207 (1962). National antitrust authorities, such as the Bundeskartellamt or the British Mo-
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law to the Court under article 177 of the EEC 'Treaty, or it may, if
national procedures make it appropriate to do so, consider the
Community interest in any order it issues.
F. How Far Can the Commission Provide Evidence to a
Plaintiff to Enable it to go Before National Courts?
There may be cases in which the plaintiff's principal reason for
complaining to the Commission rather than suing in a national
court is the hope that the Commission, by using its inspection
powers, will obtain important evidence not available under na-
tional discovery procedures. If the Commission obtains such evi-
dence, the question then arises whether the Commission must con-
tinue with its own procedure even if national proceedings would
otherwise be wholly satisfactory, or whether the Commission may
relieve itself of the case by giving the evidence in question to the
potential plaintiff for its use in national proceedings.
The question turns primarily on certain provisions of Regula-
tion 17. Article 20 provides: "Information acquired as a result of the
application of Articles 11, 12, 13 and 14 [the Commission's powers
to obtain information, inquire into economic sectors, and carry out
on-the-spot searches] shall be used only for the purpose of the
relevant request or investigation."'' 44 As already explained, the
Commission may have a duty to give a complainant documents
obtained through the use of the Commission's powers, if it is neces-
sary or appropriate to enable the complainant to make its case
properly to the Commission. If this is done, the complainant could
use the documents in national proceedings. Under article 20, how-
ever, the Commission could not give the documents to the com-
plainant merely to enable it to pursue its private claim. The ques-
tion remains whether there are any circumstances in which the
Commission could properly regard proceedings brought by a pri-
vate plaintiff in a national court as being in the Community inter-
est, so that those proceedings could be regarded as a continuation or
implementation of the Commission's investigation, for the purposes
of article 20.
nopolies and Mergers Commission, may have the right to refer questions to the Court under
article 177. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177.
144. Regulation 17, art. 20, 5 J.O. COMM. EuR. 204, 211 (1962).
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The better view seems to be that national court proceedings
brought by a private plaintiff cannot be regarded in this way. The
"competent authorities" of member states may act on behalf of the
Commission and the Community under Regulation 17 and indeed
under the Treaty itself, 45 and national courts may be "the compe-
tent authority" in a member state whose laws so provide. Neverthe-
less, in proceedings for damages where no injunction is sought, the
national court is concerned only with private interests. Where an
injunction is sought, however, the argument regarding the national
court as acting in the Community interest might be stronger. It
would be more reasonable to consider national courts as acting in
the Community interest if the courts believed it possible and neces-
sary to ensure that any settlement or order protected not only the
plaintiff's interests but the Community interest as well. This might
be the position in states where antitrust law is primary or exclu-
sively enforced by the courts rather than by an administrative
authority. But in most states, courts adjudicating private claims
rarely consider that they have power to go outside the terms of
reference of the plaintiff's claim. The more complex the remedy
sought, the more likely it is that the national courts of most member
states would leave the claim to an administrative authority. Indeed,
if the plaintiff has not proposed a remedy which takes the Commu-
nity interest into account, it is difficult to see how the court could
devise a satisfactory solution without assistance.
The Commission might make the documents available to the
relevant national antitrust authority (as it would normally do), if it
was sufficiently certain that the authority would enforce Commu-
nity law. Providing the documents to the appropriate authority
would always be legitimate, but it would not follow that potential
plaintiffs would obtain possession of them.
It is probably undesirable to prevent the Commission from
giving evidence to a complainant rather than continuing its own
procedure if there is no reason in the Community interest to do so.
If the law is as described above, either the plaintiff is deprived of
available evidence which would be valuable to him, and thus has to
seek it through national discovery procedures, or the Commission
145. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 88; Regulation 17, arts. 9(3), 10, 13, 5 J.O. COMM.
EUR. 204, 207-08 (1962); Temple Lang, Community Antitrust Law Compliance and En-
forcement, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 335, 354-59 (1981).
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has to continue with an unnecessary procedure the principal result
of which is to make the evidence available (indirectly, in the rea-
sons for the decision) to the plaintiff, enabling him to pursue his
claim for damages. It would obviously be more economical if the
Commission were free to make the evidence available to the plain-
tiff.
In the perhaps unlikely event of the Commission making avail-
able to a complainant documents that, although valuable to it
when claiming damages, were unrelated to the Commission's pro-
cedure, it seems that no claim could be made against the Commis-
sion under article 215 of the EEC Treaty if the complainant could
reasonably have been expected to obtain the documents indepen-
dently through discovery proceedings in the national courts.
G. Business Secrets and Professional Secrecy:
the Position of a Potential Plaintiff
Article 214 of the EEC Treaty prohibits all members and
officials of Community institutions from disclosing "information of
the kind covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, in partic-
ular information about undertakings, their business relations or
their cost components.' 4 This language is repeated in substance in
article 20 of Regulation 17. Breach of this prohibition would make
the Community liable to pay compensation "in accordance with the
general principles common to the laws of the Member States" for
any damage caused. 147
Articles 19 and 21 of Regulation 17 require the Commission,
when publishing notices of its intention to adopt decisions, and in
its decisions, to have regard for the legitimate interests of enter-
prises in the protection of their "business secrets."' 48 Under article
20, information obtained pursuant to Regulation 17 may be used
only for the purposes for which it was obtained. 149
Under the Commission's Staff Regulations, each official is le-
gally required to "exercise the greatest discretion with regard to all
facts and information coming to his knowledge in the course of or in
connection with the performance of his duties; he shall not in any
146. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 214.
147. Id. art. 215.
148. Regulation 17, arts. 19, 21, 5 J.O. COMM. Eua. 204, 210-11 (1962).
149. Id. art. 20, 5 J.O. CoMM. EUa. 204, 211 (1962).
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manner whatsoever disclose to any unauthorised person any docu-
ment or information not already made public."' 50 An official may
be required to pay for any damage suffered by the Commission as a
result of his serious misconduct in the performance of his duties.
Normally, the Commission accepts the view of enterprises
which claim that specified information is protected from disclosure
by these provisions. No difficulty arises or seems likely to arise in
connection with publication in decisions or advance notices of the
Commission's intention to adopt decisions favorable to the enter-
prises concerned. The Commission can avoid including the infor-
mation in question in the published documents, without thereby
affecting the rights of third parties to object to the Commission's
proposed decision. In certain cases, the Commission has published
decisions with figures omitted from the text.
The problem is more difficult where there are two parties with
adverse interests involved. Either the complainant (or intervenor)
or the enterprise against which the complaint is made may submit
information to the Commission that it regards as secret. The Com-
mission's duty to hear both parties fully makes it necessary to give
each party an opportunity to comment on the submissions of the
other as fully as possible. Therefore, the Commission in such cir-
cumstances (unless the party whose secrets are in question consents
to their disclosure) might have to rule whether the information in
question could properly be disclosed to the other party. A ruling
permitting disclosure could probably be challenged before the
Court.' 5 1 The Commission cannot use before the Court, or take into
consideration in its decision, any information on which the defend-
ant has not had an opportunity to comment. 52 Accordingly, disclo-
sure of the secrets of the complainant to the Commission is of little
use.
Similar problems may arise in antidumping procedures before
the Commission, and in antitrust proceedings before the Court of
Justice in which companies with adverse interests are involved,
150. Commission's Staff Regulations, Reg. 31, 45 J.O. COMM. EuR., 1385 (1962).
151. The question has never risen directly, but see IBM v. Commission, 1981 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 2639, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8708.
152. Musique Diffusion, Case Nos. 100/80 to 103/80, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8880; Hoffmann LaRoche & Co. v. Commission, 1979 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 461, 510-14, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. RF'. (CCH)
8527, at 7538-40.
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normally as a result of the intervention by the company in proceed-
ings to which the Commission is a party. Article 93(4) of the Rules
of Procedure of the Court allows the court, on the application of a
party, to refuse to disclose "secret or confidential" documents to an
intervenor. 15 3
There is no complete and authoritative definition of secrets for
the purposes of any of these provisions, and there is no reason to
draw distinctions between them. Article 214 prohibits disclosure of
"in particular information about undertakings, their business rela-
tions or the components of their costs.' 5 4 Clearly not all "informa-
tion about undertakings" is secret. The Court has not yet given any
guidance as to the meaning of business secrets or professional se-
crecy, but it would probably look to national laws for precedents.
At this stage in the development of the law, all cases must be
considered on their own facts. The pertinent facts would include
the exact nature of the information, the value and importance to
the enterprise of keeping it secret, and the reasons why it is sought
to be disclosed.
It seems that the law protects from disclosure both information
that would be valuable to competitors and information that, if
revealed, would be damaging to the corporation. Most secret infor-
mation is of the former kind. Secrets include:
1. technical information and know-how;
2. financial information, turnover in specialized areas or lines of
business, discounts and rebates; and
3. the identity of suppliers, customers and licensors.
In general, business secrets relate specifically to individual
companies, and not to the industry in general. Information already
published, or which the company is obligated to publish, cannot be
treated as secret. Nor is information secret if already disclosed by
the company or otherwise available to third parties who have no
obligation to keep it secret. In general, information which could
legitimately be obtained by an outsider would not be secret. The
scope of the Commission's discretion to disclose documents to a
complainant that would be available to that complainant through
discovery procedures in national courts is also unclear.
153. 25 O.J. Eul. COMM. (No. C 39) 1, 22 (1982).
154. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 214.
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The Commission sometimes prepares a non-confidential sum-
mary of confidential information to enable the other party to com-
ment on the substance of the information in question. In addition,
the Commission sometimes aggregates the sales of the other compet-
itors to prevent the corporation receiving the aggregated figures
from knowing the precise market share of any one of its competi-
tors.
Information is not "secret" merely because it would be damag-
ing evidence against a particular corporation in a national antitrust
proceeding or in a private suit for damages.
The identity of a complainant can not usually be kept secret
from the enterprise complained against. However, complainants
sometimes ask that the complaint be kept secret initially, for fear of
reprisals (which, if they occurred, would almost always themselves
be unlawful 155).
The question arises what rules about disclosure of business
secrets should be applied in national courts in proceedings for
breach of Community law, insofar as the national courts may order
discovery of documents by either party. The answer seems to be
that national courts will apply their own national law rules, even
though these may differ from the Community law rules summa-
rized above. There does not seem to be any legal basis on which
national courts could apply the Community law rules by analogy in
proceedings for damages or an injunction. If anomalies result, they
can only be dealt with by legislation either at the state or Commu-
nity level.
H. Claims Against Member States Which Are Responsible
for Restrictive Agreements: Articles 5 and 90
and Potential Plaintiffs
It has already been mentioned that articles 5 and 90 of the
EEC Treaty prohibit member states from enacting or maintaining
in force any measure which is contrary to articles 85 and 86, among
other articles, even in the case of publicly-owned corporations and
corporations to which the state has given special or exclusive
155. Temple Lang, supra note 40, at 36-38. Reprisals would also be contrary to national
laws on conspiracy to injure. Cf. Regulation 3017, art. 8, 22 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 339) 1
(1979) (protection against dumped or subsidized imports into the European Community).
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rights.15 6 There is a strictly limited exception to this rule in article
90(2), which need not be discussed here.15 7
Article 90 is directly applicable. It creates rights which na-
tional courts must enforce against any state measure intended to
obligate, authorize or encourage a public enterprise to infringe
articles 85 and 86.158 It is submitted that because articles 85 and 86
are directly applicable, article 5 accords the same rights a fortiori
when public enterprises are not involved. The national court of the
state in question must give an effective remedy against the state or
the authority in appropriate cases, as well as against other corpora-
tions involved. 159 This means that if a state measure provides, for
example, that only members of a trade association are entitled to
enter a particular market, as a means of ensuring self-regulation by
the association concerned, the state is liable to pay damages to a
nonmember of the association because the state has purported to
impose a market entry cartel. Similarly, if the state grants an
official authorization on condition that the recipient buy certain
goods only from sources within the state, the national courts must
declare the condition to be invalid and unlawful under Community
law, and award damages to any alternative supplier who has suf-
fered as a result.
In view of the very clear language of the Court that national
courts must give an effective remedy if national measures interfere
with private rights protected by Community law, 160 no sovereign
immunity defense would be permitted by Community law even if
such a defense would otherwise be available under national law.
I. Arbitration of Private Damage Claims Under Articles 85 and 86
Defendants in proceedings for damages under articles 85 and
86 will wish to avoid publicity to avoid claims by other plaintiffs
similarly situated. If the claims cannot be settled, the defendants
may want to have them dealt with by arbitration without pub-
licity.
156. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 5, 90.
157. See id. art. 90(2).
158. Ex parte Sacchi, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 409, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM.
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8267.
159. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. MIRECO S.A.S., 1980 E. Comm.




It has thus far been generally assumed, apparently without
much critical analysis, that no Community public policy exists to
prevent the arbitration of private claims for breach of Community
antitrust law. Presumably, this is assumed because Community
antitrust law matters are not criminal. 16 ' The Commission has
never formally questioned this view, although the Community in-
terest in private claims is obvious, especially if the claim is for an
injunction rather than damages. Since the Court of Justice ruled in
1982 that most private arbitration tribunals are not required or
even permitted to refer questions of Community law to the Court
under article 177 of the EEC Treaty, 6 2 the Community interest is
not necessarily protected in arbitration proceedings, as it should be
in national courts. This ruling supports the proposition that private
claims for breach of Community antitrust law may not be referred
to arbitration. However, certain other questions are discussed be-
low on the assumption that some or all claims may lawfully be
referred to private arbitration, or that Community antitrust issues
will arise in cases which have been lawfully referred to private
arbitration.
Some questions about arbitration under Community antitrust
law have arisen because of unofficial claims of well-established
arbitration systems in European non-member states. These ques-
tions have arisen primarily in relation to arbitration between par-
ties to agreements which are contrary to EEC antitrust law. How-
ever, similar problems could perhaps arise if claims or
counterclaims for damages for breach of EEC antitrust law were
heard by arbitrators, or if a party to an unlawful agreement tried to
recover money paid on the basis of the agreement. The questions
arose because it has been said that under these arbitration systems,
the arbitrators would enforce an agreement even if it was incom-
patible with Community antitrust law. This comment is surprising
and does not seem well considered for several reasons:
1. an agreement to refer a dispute to arbitration in order to avoid
the application of a rule of Community antitrust law would be
contrary to public policy in EEC member states, as would an
161. Regulation 17, art. 15(4), 5 J.O. COMM. EUR. 204, 210 (1962), says that fines are
not of a criminal law nature.
162. Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei v. Reederei Mond Hochseefisherei Nordstern,
1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1095, [1981-1983 Transfer Finder] COMM. MKT. REP (CCH)
1 8822.
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agreement not to claim rights given by Community antitrust
law;
2. the comment ignores the general principle of private interna-
tional law that an agreement should not be enforced if it is
unlawful under the law of the place where it is to be per-
formed. 6 3 If, therefore, an agreement were to be performed in
the Community, an arbitration tribunal in a non-Community
country could not ignore Community antitrust law without in-
fringing the general principle just mentioned. It also appears
that damages should be awarded, regardless of where the arbi-
tration is conducted, for loss caused by a breach of Community
antitrust law committed in the Community;
3. if an arbitration tribunal did enforce a contract which was
contrary to Community antitrust law, its award would be unen-
forceable in the member states of the Community, since enforce-
ment would be contrary to the obligations of member states
under the Treaty. 6 4
In practice, however, plaintiffs claiming damages for Commu-
nity antitrust law violations would not use an arbitration system
unless they were satisfied that the law was to be correctly applied.
Problems would likely arise only if the claim was made in the
course of arbitration proceedings concerned with other issues.
This background explains the cautious attitude of the Commis-
sion towards arbitration awards. The relevant legal rules can be
briefly summarized as follows:
Arbitration clauses are not in themselves restrictive of competi-
tion. Nevertheless, they may result in restrictions of competition
because:
1. arbitrators may act on understandings between the parties that
are restrictive, and that have not been expressed in writing in
the arbitration clause of the agreement;
2. arbitrators may treat agreements or practices that do not comply
with articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty as lawful, even in
circumstances in which Community law applies. In such cir-
cumstances, a plaintiff claiming damages for breach of articles
85 and 86 might be prevented from recovering;
163. See A. DIcEY & J. MomUs, CONFLICT OF LAWS 760 (8th ed. 1967).
164. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 5; COMM'N OF THE EuR. COMMUNITIES, TENTH
REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 27-28 (1981).
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3. arbitrators sometimes make awards that restrict competition
between the parties, even where the original agreements were
not inherently restrictive;
4. the possibility of being brought before an arbitrator for an al-
leged violation of a vaguely worded agreement might cause
enterprises to interpret and act on the agreement in such a way
as to avoid any risk of being accused of violating it, and thus
cause them to avoid normal competitive practices. 165
The possibility that an arbitration clause might restrict competition
arises primarily where the arbitration concerns a pre-existing agree-
ment between the parties. However, arbitration in practice is more
likely to give rise to restrictive arrangements between the parties if
the plaintiff is claiming that the other party has engaged in dump-
ing or predatory pricing or in acts of unfair competition.
More generally:
1. Parties are not free to achieve indirectly through arbitration
what they could not legally do by agreement. 166 The decisions of
arbitrators appointed by agreement between the parties or to whom
a controversy has been referred by agreement cannot have a higher
165. See IFTRA Aluminum, O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 228) 3 (1975).
166. Parties to a contract are not free to create exemptions from rules of Community
Law. Nordsee Deutsche Hochseefischerei v. Reederei Mond Hochfisherei Nordstern, 1982 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1095, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP'. (CCH) 8822;
Broekmeulen v. General Practitioner Registration Comm., 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2311,
[1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8773; Dansk Supermarked A/S v.
Imerco A/S, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 181, 195, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8729.
All arrangements to submit disputes to arbitration are the result of an agreement made
at some stage, whether before or after the dispute arose. Therefore, the award is always the
result of an agreement between the enterprises concerned. It could also be regarded as a
decision of an association of enterprises, the association being for the purpose of resolving
disputes, if for no wider purpose. Since arbitration awards contrary to article 85 cannot be
enforced in the Community, it could be said that if an enterprise complies with such an
award it does so voluntarily, and as a result of an agreement to do so.
It is true that in most cases the Commission has no more reason to attack an arbitral
award with which it disagrees than it has to attack a decision of a lower national court which
it believes to be erroneous. But in the case of arbitration, it is important, because the parties
have voluntarily submitted to arbitration, to be able to ensure that they have not thereby
evaded the law that the Commission can reasonably expect will normally be correctly applied
by the national courts.
Even if the Commission has no power to attack arbitration awards as such, the Commis-
sion clearly has power to attack the agreement on which the arbitration was based, on the
ground that it has resulted in a restriction of competition.
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status than an agreement or a "decision by an association of enter-
prises."
2. An arbitration award cannot supercede a decision of a
national court of a member state in the same or similar controversy.
The Commission is not bound by a decision of a national cartel
authority, and cannot be bound by an award of an arbitration
tribunal. Moreover, such an award cannot prevent the Commission
from enforcing Community competition law.
3. A national court decision or an arbitration award cannot
confer rights on a company that, if exercised, would be incompati-
ble with Community law. Therefore, if a court decision or an
award contrary to Community competition law (or, for example, to
Community rules on freedom of movement of patented or trade-
marked goods) cannot enable a company to do something which it
could not otherwise legally do under Community law, such a deci-
sion or award is even less likely to compel it to do something which
it could not do legally under Community law.
4. The Commission reserves the right to take action against
enterprises acting on or trying to enforce an agreement which is
contrary to Community competition law. The Commission would
certainly have to reserve the right to challenge the legality of an
award, as well as the lawfulness of the agreement in question, if the
parties had deliberately chosen an arbitrator, a forum or an appli-
cable law under which Community law would not be followed.
J. The Effects of Unilateral Action Making a Restrictive Agreement
Unlawful Under Article 85
If article 85(1) applies to a restrictive agreement, the Commis-
sion may nevertheless exempt that agreement under article 85(3).
However, the agreement may be made ineligible for exemption, or
an individual or legislative exemption may be made inapplicable,
by the unilateral action of one party to the agreement. In practice,
unilateral action sufficient to make article 85(3) inapplicable is
usually a measure to maintain resale prices or interfere with im-
ports or exports from one EEC member state to another. 1 7 This
167. Regulation 67, art. 3, 10 J.O. COMM. EutR. 849 (1967); Regulation 1983, art. 3, 26
O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 173) 1 (1983); Ford-Werke, O.J. Eua. COMM. (No. L 256) 30
(1982); Tepea B.V. v. Commission, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1391, [1977-1978 Transfer
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means that the action of one party to the agreement can make the
agreement void under article 85(2) and can expose all the parties to
actions for damages by firms injured by the unlawful agreement. In
these circumstances, the parties to the agreement that were not
involved in the unilateral action would probably have a right of
indemnification against those who were involved."' This right of
indemnification is accorded provided the parties became joint tort-
feasors only as a result of the unilateral act and provided that the
agreement would have been exempt but for the unilateral action. It
seems that all the parties to the agreement could probably be sued
by the injured third party. More difficult questions may arise con-
cerning causation, however, if the claim is for loss caused by the
unilateral action rather than by the unlawful agreement as such.
K. Incentives for Defendants to Settle
The possibility of claims for damages by third parties creates
an incentive for defendant corporations to settle cases brought by
the Commission. This is because by settling they usually make it
unnecessary for the Commission to adopt a decision ruling that
unlawful conduct has occurred and, in article 86 cases, that the
defendant occupies a dominant position. Such a decision greatly
helps a plaintiff in a claim for damages because it relieves him from
having to prove that an infringement has been committed or that
the defendant is dominant. If there is no decision, the defendant
can point out that, by ceasing the conduct complained of, it did not
concede dominance or unlawful conduct, and the plaintiff is
obliged to prove its case. It is therefore likely that in the future,
fewer relatively hopeless cases will be argued until the Commission
is compelled to make a formal decision where third parties have
suffered loss as a result of the conduct and can be expected to sue.
For the same reasons, defendants have an incentive to settle
with complainants before the Commission has adopted a decision,
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8467; EMI v. CBS, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 811,
[1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8350; Advocaat Zwarte Kip, O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 237) 12 (1974); Consten S.A. v. Commission, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299,
[1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046.
168. H. McGRcoa, DAMAGES ch. 16 (14th ed. 1980).
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since the defendant's bargaining position is stronger before a deci-
sion has been adopted. In addition, the Commission may be more
likely to accept a settlement with the defendant if the complaint has
been withdrawn or satisfied.
More generally, of course, the likelihood of claims for damages
creates an extra incentive for defendants to settle because the cost of
losing in the end is higher. If the defendant genuinely expects to
prevail, however, this may provide an extra reason to litigate the
case.
To put this in perspective, over 90% of all cases now dealt
with by the Commission result in settlements without formal deci-
sions. The figures for each year are given in the Annual Reports of
the Commission on Competition Policy. In 1982, for example, 479
cases were settled informally without decisions.16 9
L. Claims by Public Authorities for Damages
Public authorities are from time to time seriously overcharged
as a result of collusive tendering for public works and public supply
contracts, or unlawful agreements as to which corporation will
tender bids. Since it will now become generally recognized that
public authorities may recover compensation in such circum-
stances, it is to be expected that the auditors of public authorities
will criticize any authorities which do not make claims for compen-
sation in appropriate circumstances.
M. United States Corporations Wishing To Enter
European Community Markets
United States businessmen often discover that, in spite of Com-
munity antitrust law, markets in Europe are more cartellized than
corresponding markets in the United States, and that it is sometimes
difficult for United States corporations to obtain access to markets
in the Community. The availability of damages and injunctions in
national courts provides United States corporations with new ways
of ensuring full participation in European markets, from which
they may now be unlawfully excluded.
169. COMM'N OF THE Euv. COMMUNITIES, TWELFTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
(1983).
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IV. COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS AND
NATIONAL COURTS
A. Courses of Action Open to a National Court
According to the circumstances, a national court faced with a
claim for damages or an injunction under article 85 or 86 may:
1. decide that the case falls within the Regulations on transport or
on agricultural agreements, and that it should be dealt with in
accordance with the appropriate procedure;
2. decide that the case falls under a group exemption under article
85(3);
3. decide the questions of fact and of law itself;
4. treat the agreement as valid under the doctrine of provisional
validity.
In connection with any of the above courses of action, the
national court may, and a final court of appeal must, refer any
question of Community law (as distinct from questions of the appli-
cation of Community law to the facts) to the Court of Justice under
article 177 of the EEC Treaty if a ruling on the question is necessary
to enable the national court to render a judgement.17 0
The national court may also adjourn the case to allow the
Commission to decide whether there has been a breach of Commu-
nity law and, if appropriate, to deal with all the remedies except
damages.1 7' This includes cases where:
1. the national court considers that the Commission should investi-
gate the circumstances fully; for example, if evidence needs to be
obtained in several member states which would not be available
under national discovery procedures;
2. the court wishes the Commission to decide whether an individ-
ual exemption under article 85(3) should be granted (assuming
that the Commission has either been notified of the agreement
170. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177.
171. Kon detects "a tendency, although by no means a policy" of English courts, but not
German courts, to adjourn national proceedings pending determination by Community
institutions. Kon, Article 85, 3: A Case for Application by National Courts, 19 COMMON
MKT. L. REV. 541, 557 (1982). Presumably in cases where national courts are more confident
of reaching the correct result themselves, they will be less likely to adjourn. But see Stein-
dorff, Article 85, 3: No Case For Application by National Courts, 20 COMMON MKT. L.
REv. 125 (1982).
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or does not require notification, since a national court cannot
give such an exemption and cannot act as if one had been given);
3. the court believes that the case is one of great difficulty, contro-
versy or complexity, or involves evidence in other member
states, or where the appropriate remedy is complex (e.g. divesti-
ture), and will have to apply in several member states. In such
cases it might be more efficient and more economical for the
whole case to be dealt with by the Commission, subject to
review by the Court of Justice, rather than by national courts
with the guidance of the Court of Justice on points of Commu-
nity law;
4. the court has been informed that the Commission is already
dealing with the case and wishes to avoid duplication of effort
and the risk of conflicting decisions. The Commission has power
to deprive a national antitrust authority of jurisdiction over the
Community law aspects of a case by beginning a Commission
procedure, 172 but this does not deprive a court of jurisdiction
over private claims;173
5. a Community fine imposed by the Commission seems appropri-
ate.
B. The Relationship Between the Commission and National Courts
In a case referred to the Court of Justice by a national court
under article 177, the only issues before the Court pertain to Com-
munity law. Therefore, the Commission may submit arguments to
the Court only on those points of law. It may not submit evidence
or arguments as to the application of the law to the facts of the
particular case. This does not exclude the possibility of a Brandeis
brief giving general economic, social or technical background, but
it does exclude evidence specifically related to the issues of fact to be
decided by the national court. The role of the Commission in an
article 177 case is, therefore, quite different from its role in its own
procedure, in which it investigates and makes findings of fact, and
applies the law to the facts, exercising a certain amount of discre-
tion in the application of article 85(3). 174
It is sometimes suggested that the Commission should inter-
vene in national court proceedings between private parties, either
172. Regulation 17, art. 9, 5 J.0. COMM. EuR. 204, 207 (1962).
173. Belgische Radio en Televisie (BRT) v. SABAM, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 51,
[1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8268.
174. Compare EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 85(3) with id. art. 177.
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to argue that a question should be referred to the Court of Justice,
or to allow the Commission to deal with the case, or to argue in
favor of some particular interpretation of Community law. How-
ever, even if the national rules of procedure permitted such inter-
vention by the Commission, there are several objections:
1. it is for the national court to decide whether a question of
Community law needs to be referred to Luxembourg under
article 177 of the EEC Treaty. This depends on how the national
judge views the case, and the Commission has no role in helping
him to decide the case before him;
2. it would be inappropriate and even improper for the Commis-
sion to take sides in a dispute before a national court (as distinct
from merely making submissions on a point of law) unless it had
investigated the matter in accordance with Regulation 17 and its
own procedure-at which point it should adopt a decision in the
usual manner and allow the national court to draw conclusions
from it if appropriate; 75
3. the Commission, in the exercise of its own powers, is not subject
to17 and could not be bound by any findings of fact or of
Community law made by a national court. Therefore, it would
seem odd for the Commission to argue such a point before such a
court;
4. issues of Community law arising in proceedings before national
courts are to be dealt with by them and by the Court of Jus-
tice. 177 The only role provided by the Treaty for the Commission
is as an amicus curiae before the Court of Justice.178 Certainly,
the Commission should not seek to persuade a national court to
decide a question of Community law without referring it to
Luxembourg;
5. the Commission does not have the considerable amount of man-
power which would be needed to intervene frequently in cases
before national courts;
175. Walt Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, [1967-1970
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8056.
176. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 164, 183; Granaria, B.V. v. Hoofdproduktschap
voor Akkerbouwprodukten, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 623, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8553; Commission v. Council, 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 263,
[1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8134; Humblet v. Belgium, 1960
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 559, 568, 2 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 5242.45.
177. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177.
178. Article 20, Statute of the Court of Justice, 298 U.N.T.S. 147, 152.
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6. in the civil law systems in eight of the ten EEC member states,
precedential value of a national court judgement is not as signifi-
cant as it would be in a common law system. Accordingly, the
need for the Commission to intervene in order to obtain a favor-
able precedent is less;
7. unlike the United States Department of Justice, the Commission
does not need to appear before any court to enforce Community
antitrust law.
C. The Plaintiff's View of the Relative Merits of Complaints
to the Commission and Proceedings in National Courts
An enterprise which believes it has suffered or is likely to suffer
loss as a result of an infringement of articles 85 and 86 may either
complain to the Commission, or bring proceedings for an injunc-
tion and compensation in one (or more than one) national court, or
both.
The advantages of complaining to the Commission are:
1. it can be done informally and inexpensively. However, the bet-
ter-documented and better-argued a complaint is, the more
likely it is to be acted upon. A complaint, once made, may need
to be pursued, and the legal costs of pursuing it may not be very
different from the cost of proceedings in a national court;
2. the complaint may get the Commission to itself prosecute the
case at relatively little cost to the complainant;
3. the Commission has powers to obtain documents which, if fully
used, would be more likely to produce valuable evidence than
discovery or the equivalent in many national courts. If it is
thought that the defendant may destroy incriminating docu-
ments, a surprise investigation by the Commission is preferable
to a discovery order from a national court. A complainant might
receive from the Commission documents which it could subse-
quently use in claiming damages. This is important because a
plaintiff's rights to discover in some EEC member states are
considerably less than in the United States;
4. a cease and desist order of the Commission, or an interim mea-
sure of the Commission, will apply throughout the Community.
A corresponding permanent or temporary injunction of a na-
tional court would have little effect outside the state to which
the court belonged;
5. a formal decision of the Commission ruling that an infringement
of article 85 or article 86 had been committed, if not challenged
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before the Court of Justice or if upheld there, would subse-
quently be treated in practice as conclusive by a national court.
However, the Commission is not required to adopt a formal
decision merely for the purpose of facilitating private claims for
compensation. If the Commission is satisfied that an infringe-
ment has ceased and that neither a fine nor a cease and desist
order is needed, it will not normally adopt a decision;
6. an unsuccessful complainant before the Commission cannot be
ordered to pay the defendant's. legal costs;
7. a knowledgeable complainant can influence the terms of a Com-
mission cease and desist order or a settlement between the Com-
mission and the defendants at a relatively low cost;
8. under Community law a complainant may intervene in a case
before the Court of Justice between the Commission and the
parties to an antitrust violation. 179 He, therefore, still has a voice
at the final judicial stage of the case. This is not quite as impor-
tant as it might seem, however, because the Court has no juris-
diction to re-write a Commission decision, but only to annul it
wholly or in part, and to vary the amount of a fine. 180 Conse-
quently the complainant's role before the Court is essentially
limited to supporting the Commission's decision.
The advantages of proceedings in a national court are:
1. only a national court can award compensation. The Commis-
sion has no jurisdiction to do so. This is the most important
reason for choosing a national court;
2. national courts in some countries can issue injunctions ex parte.
It appears that the Commission has no power to do so. Also,
some national courts issue, or can issue in appropriate circum-
stances, temporary injunctions much more quickly than the
Commission is likely to grant interim measures;
3. the Commission has no power to award attorney's fees to a
successful complainant, and even a complainant who wins be-
fore the Court cannot recover his legal expenses in connection
with the administrative procedure. The attorneys' fees of an
application to a national court may be much less than the fees
charged for several visits to the Commission in Brussels;
179. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 173.
180. See id. art. 174.
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4. it is possible to continue a claim under national antitrust law or
unfair competition law with a claim under Community law in a
national court. This cannot be done in a complaint to the Com-
mission; 181
5. the availability of compensation from a national court may
mean that damage caused by a punitive infringement of articles
85 and 86 is not "serious and irreparable" so as to justify the
Commission ordering interim measures. The prerequisites for
the Commission's interim measures may be stricter than those
for an injunction in some national courts. The Commission or-
ders interim measures only if it considers that "a reasonably
strong prima facie case" has been shown, 18 2 but in England, for
example, only an "arguable" case is necessary.18 3 In the three
and a half years after the Court confirmed that the Commission
has power to grant interim measures, only two decisions order-
ing interim measures have been adopted by the Commission. 8 4
On this question the Community law is not yet clear; 18 5
6. it is submitted that the Commission may properly decline to deal
with a complaint that could be satisfactorily dealt with by a
national court, 86 although the Commission has never said so. If
this is correct, and if the Commission began to refuse to deal
with complaints on this ground, there might be little point in
making certain kinds of complaints to the Commission. Cer-
tainly, a complaint should include a statement of the reasons
why the complainant claims that it cannot expect to obtain a
satisfactory result from a national court;
181. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, arts. 177-182 (describing the jurisdiction of the
Court of Justice).
182. C. KERSE, EEC ANTITRUST PROCEDURE 322 (1981) (statement of the Commission on
interim measures). See also Distribution System of Ford-Werke AG, 25 O.J. EuR. COMM.
(No. L 256) 20 (1982).
183. See C. KERSE, EEC ANTITRUST PROCEDURE 266-67 (1981).
184. Ford-Werke, O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 256) 20 (1982). This decision was the
subject of cases 229/82R and 228/82R. Ford v. Commission, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3091
and Akzo Chemie, O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 252) 13 (1983), COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
10,517. But see British Sugar-Berisford, COMM'N OF THE EUR. COMMUNITIES, TWELFTH
REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 82-83 (1983); IGR Stereo Television and Amicon-Fortia-
Wright, COMM'N OF THE EUR. COMMUNITIES, ELEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION PoLICY 63-
64, 73-74 (1982).
185. See Temple Lang, The Power of the Commission to Order Interim Measures in
Competition Cases, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 49 (1981).
186. A number of cases in which claims for compensation or injunctions could be
brought before national courts are cases in which there is no real community interest, and
which a national court would deal with easily.
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7. under the law of Ireland and England, the penalties for breach
of an injunction granted by a court include imprisonment for
contempt of court. 18 7 Breach of a Commission decision involves
only fines on the company.
D. The Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters
The Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judg-
ments in Civil and Commercial Matters1 88 (Convention) provides
for reciprocal enforcement of judgments between member states of
the Community and lays down a number of rules concerning the
jurisdiction of national courts. Some of these rules would apply to
tort (ex delicto) claims for damages for breach of Community anti-
trust law. The pertinent rules under the Convention are, in brief, as
follows:
1. the defendant may be sued where it is domiciled;18 9
2. the defendant may be sued in tort in the courts of the state
where the event causing the harm occurred; 90
3. if the dispute arises out of the operations of a branch, agency or
other establishment, the defendant may be sued where it is
situated;
4. if there are several defendants, they may be sued in the courts of
a state where any one of them is domiciled;'
5. preliminary injunctions ("provisional, including protective mea-
sures," interlocutory injunctions, measures en ref~r6, kort ged-
ing, etc.) may be applied for in any contracting state even if
another state has jurisdiction as to the substance of the claim; 92
187. 9 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND §§ 88-94 (Lord Hailsham ed. 4th ed. 1974).
188. 26 O.J. EuR. CoMm. (No. C 97) 1 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Convention]. For the
Protocol on the interpretation of the Convention by the Court of Justice, see id. at 24. See also
the Reports by Mr. P. Jenard on the Convention and on (among other things) the Protocol,
and the Report of Professor Schlosser on the Convention, both in 22 O.J. Eua. COMM. (No. C
59) (1979).
189. Convention, supra note 188, art. 2. The choice of law rules for determining
domicile are in id. arts. 52, 53.
190. Id., art. 5(3).
191. Id., art. 5(5). See Somafer, S.A. v. Saar-ferngas, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2183,
[1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8516; De Bloos v. Bouyer, 1977 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1497, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8444.
192. Convention, supra note 188, art. 6(1).
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6. a judgment shall not be recognized if it is contrary to public
policy in the state in which recognition is sought.1
9 3
In a leading case on jurisdiction in tort cases under the Con-
vention, Bier v. Mines de Potasse d'Alsace, 9 4 the Court of Justice
interpreted the clause which gives jurisdiction to the court of the
state "where the harmful event occurred."'' 9 5 The plaintiff, a Dutch
horticultural firm, claimed to have been injured by the French
defendant's dumping of saline waste into the Rhine River. The
defendant's acts causing the damage occurred in France, while the
damage to the plaintiff occurred in the Netherlands. The Court said
that the phrase quoted applied to both places and that the plaintiff
could sue in either state.19 6
This principle would also apply to a restrictive agreement or
practice, prohibited by articles 85 and 86, that was made or acted
on in one state but caused damage in another. It seems to follow
that injunctions or the equivalent can also be obtained in either
state, subject to national law rules.
The primary purpose of the Convention is to enable judgments
given by national courts of each member state to be enforceable
without difficulty in all other members states. This is provided for
by Title III of the Convention.l°7
E. Who May Sue and for What? National Law Questions and
"Mixed" Questions of Community Law and National Law
In principle, if claims may be made for losses caused by an
infringement of articles 85 and 86, anyone who has suffered such a
loss, provided that it is sufficiently direct, may make such claims.
There does not seem to be any reason in Community law to say that
only some of the provisions of those articles are for the protection of
private rights. Potential plaintiffs would, therefore, include both
customers and competitors of the parties to the unlawful agreement
193. Id. art. 27(1); see COMM'N OF THE Eua. COMMUNITIES, TENTH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY (1981).
194. 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1735, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 1 8378.
195. Id. at 1748, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8378, at 7822.
196. Id., at 1749, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8378, at 7822.
197. Convention, supra note 188, Title III.
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or practice, and suppliers in the case of abuse of dominant buying
power (monopsony). Claims could be brought for loss caused by
both exploitative, anticompetitive and reprisal abuses. Specifically,
claims could be brought for loss due to:
1. an unlawful boycott or refusal to supply goods or services;
2. loss of sales or of opportunities to sell due to unlawful exclusive
agreements, fidelity rebates, tying clauses, joint ventures supply-
ing raw materials or components 98 or any other exclusionary
practice;
3. price fixing or the unfairly high prices of a dominant seller;
4. discriminatory prices;
5. predatory pricing which damages competitors;
6. unfairly low prices paid by a dominant buyer;
7. onerous terms in supply contracts or, in the case of a dominant
buyer, purchasing contracts;
8. market sharing agreements, especially where prices are lower in
other member states, and all agreements and practices interfer-
ing with parallel imports into the member state where the plain-
tiff operates;
9. the use of patents and trademarks to interfere with parallel
imports where this is the result of an unlawful agreement.199
Because article 86 prohibits exploitative abuses as well as anticom-
petitive ones, the range of claims which may be made is certainly
wider than under United States antitrust law.
In the case of an unlawful takeover, merger or joint venture, it
might be easier and better for a plaintiff to get an injunction to
prevent the transaction from proceeding, which would benefit ev-
eryone, rather than seeking compensation, which would benefit
only the plaintiff. The absence in Europe of class actions for com-
pensation makes it even more appropriate to grant injunctions
rather than compensation. Also, the difficulty of calculating how
much loss has been caused by an infringement (quite apart from
uncertainty as to the rules of law determining the amount of the loss
recoverable) may make it preferable in many cases to award injunc-
tions when they are otherwise appropriate.
198. Temple Lang, European Community Antitrust Law and Joint Ventures Involving
Transfer of Technology, in 1982 FoRDHAM CORPoRATE LAW INSTITUTE 203, 230-33 (B. Hawk
ed. 1983).
199. Keurkoop v. Nancy Kean Gifts, Case No. 144/81, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8861.
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Injunctions will also no doubt be sought by companies which
are being taken over. If a plaintiff desires an injunction, he will
have to decide whether to sue in a national court or to ask the
Commission to make the order he wishes. A plaintiff seeking com-
pensation can only obtain it by proceedings in a national court.
In the present state of Community law, it is primarily national
law rules that govern the recovery of damages or the grant of an
injunction in any given situation.20 0 For several reasons, however,
these questions are not governed only by national law rules. First,
neither procedural nor substantive national rules may make it im-
possible in practice to exercise the rights which national courts have
a duty to protect.2 01 It is too soon to say exactly what minimum
rights must be protected by national courts, but by definition this
minimum is determined by Community law, not by national
law.2 0 2 Second, under national laws an action for breach of statu-
tory duty will lie only for injury within the scope of the statute.
That scope, in the case of articles 85 and 86, is a question of
Community law to be determined ultimately by the Court, just as
the question whether articles 85 and 86 are laws for the protection
of individual interests is in the first place question of Community
law. Therefore, both the minimum and the maximum extents of the
protection given to private plaintiffs seem to be in the first instance
questions of Community law. This means that the Court may have
opportunities to clarify the extent of the substantive protection
which should be given by national courts of member states even
without any harmonization directive. Presumably the Court, to
decide the points of Community law just referred to, may look at
the national law on recovery of damages for breach of statutory
duty. The failure of a national law to protect a plaintiff who was
entitled to protection under Community law, or in circumstances in
which he was entitled to protection, would presumably be a breach
of the obligations of the member state under the Treaty.
200. MIRECO, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2559, 2574-75, [1979-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8694, at 8318-19.
201. One rule of national law which would gravely interfere with the effective enforce-
ment of plaintiff's rights is the English rule allowing a defendant to refuse to produce
documents on the grounds that they might expose it to fines under Community law. See In Re
Westinghouse Uranium Contract, 1978 A.C. 547.
202. J. TEMPLE LANG, THE COMMON MARKEr AND COMMON LAW ch. 17 (1966).
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The reference to users and consumers (utilisateurs) in article
85(3), and the fact that the Commission has suggested in written
submissions to the Court that consumers may sue, would support
the view that ultimate consumers may sue for losses which they
have suffered even if they had not bought directly from parties to
the infringement.
However, the BMW judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof 2 3 sug-
gests that in German law the plaintiff can recover only if his injury
was a direct and primary result of the antitrust violation.2 0 4 This
raises both standing to sue and causation issues.
Even if under existing national law rules, Community law or a
future directive, only plaintiffs directly injured by an unlawful
agreement or practice could sue, the number of potential claimants
would still be large.
It does not seem that in Community law there is any need for a
plaintiff to prove any injury to the public interest. Any such re-
quirement would be inconsistent with the Camera Care judgment
of the Court. 20 5 There is no distinction in Community law between
per se and other infringements, so that no rule based on such a
distinction could be applied in the Community. 20 6
Subject to the overriding questions of Community law just
mentioned, to answer the questions when may a plaintiff sue for
loss caused by an infringement and for which infringements may he
recover, it would be necessary to look at the national laws of the ten
member states of the Community, on both procedural and substan-
tive matters. Of particular relevance to examine would be:
1. standing to sue, especially of indirect purchasers and consumer
and other representative organisations;
2. causation and directness of injury and the nature of the injury
which can be sued for;
3. whether intention or negligence must be proved;
4. measure of damages (availability of compensation for loss of
profits, decreased revenue, increased costs, consequential loss of
business and increased costs that might have been passed on to
the plaintiff's customers);
203. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
204. See id.
205. See Camera Care Ltd. v. Commission, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 119, [1979-
1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8645.
206. ABA, ANTITRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS 265-67 (1975).
19841
460 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:389
5. if a claim against a state authority for a breach of article 5 or
article 90 is planned, the rules relating to claims or injunctions
against the state.
It is submitted that Community law may already imply crite-
ria in relation to the above matters. Other relevant national laws
would concern:
1. prescription (limitation) including whether the claim arose
when the infringement occurred or when the damage was
suffered;
2. national law requirements for temporary or permanent injunc-
tions, if either is needed or may become necessary, and
whether injunctions imposing positive duties such as the duty
to supply goods or services, are possible;
3. national law rules on in pari delicto and unclean hands;
4. whether the national court's injunction can have any extra-
territorial effect in other member states of the Community;
5. indemnity and contributions between defendants and the basis
for determining the amount of any contributions that might be
recoverable;
6. discovery and limitations on the duty to disclose documents,
including the principle against self-incrimination and restric-
tions on the powers of national courts to order production of
documents physically situated in other member states;
7. class actions;
8. recovery by a successful plaintiff of his attorney's fees and
expenses;
9. when injunctions will be thought more appropriate than dam-
ages, and vice versa;
10. estoppel due to the plaintiff's failure to produce evidence to the
Commission during the Commission's procedure.
F. The Significance of National Law Questions
Differences among the national law rules of the ten member
states of the European Community on the national law questions
listed above are important because unfavorable national law rules
may make it impossible in practice to exercise the rights that it is
believed that the Treaty gives to plaintiffs. If this is indeed the
position, the question arises whether the national law rules them-
selves infringe the obligations of the state under article 5 of the EEC
Treaty to provide an adequate remedy for infringement of Commu-
nity law. The differences among national law rules are also impor-
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tant for potential plaintiffs, because they may influence its choice of
the state in which it will bring its proceedings. Such differences
among national laws, therefore, may have to be harmonized by
means of a Community directive.
A summary of the national laws of the ten present member
states of the Community on all these subjects, or even some of the
principal differences among them, is outside the scope of this Arti-
cle. Moreover, the national laws do not seem to be very clear on
many of the subjects.20 7 Most of the case law on breach of statutory
duty or the equivalent concerns simpler cases of physical injury.
It may be useful, however, to make a few brief comments, by
way of example, on the national laws of three of the larger member
states on one important topic, discovery.
G. Example of Discovery: French, German and English Law
Article 142 of the new French Code of Civil Procedure allows
one party to ask for evidence in the possession of the other.20 8 If the
evidence is withheld, the court may order it to be produced at the
request of the party wishing to use it. This corresponds to a discov-
ery procedure, with the important qualification that the court itself
must be satisfied that the request for production is justified. 20 The
party seeking production must persuade the court that its request is
justified without the help of interrogatories, which do not exist in
French civil procedure.
Under paragraphs 142 to 144 of the German Zivilprozes-
sordnung, the judge has wide powers to order disclosure and pro-
duction of documents to the Court, and therefore to the other
party. 210 However, the parties have no means of compelling disclo-
sure to them of documents held by the other side. All they can do is
persuade the judge that the court needs to see the documents in
question, for example, when the document to be produced is impor-
tant in deciding the amount of the damage suffered by the plaintiff.
In English law, discovery is governed by Order 24, Rule 1 of
the Supreme Court Rules. 21 1 Interrogatories are permitted. The
207. In connection with injury to direct purchasers in English law, see, e.g., H.
McGregoR, DAMAGES 116-21 (14th ed. 1980).
208. Nouveau code de procedure civile art. 142 (75e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1983) (Fr.).
209. Id.
210. Zivilprozessordnung 142-44 (W. Ger.).
211. Rules of the Supreme Court, 1965, Ord. 24, r.l.
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plaintiff may apply for an order for discovery before commencing
proceedings. After the action has commenced, discovery of docu-
ments in the hands of each party is automatic. 212
The differences between these three procedures should not be
exaggerated, but it will be seen that they result from different
conceptions of the role of the judge. Under the German procedure,
the judge has an active, indeed decisive, role in determining how
the proceedings should develop. The English procedure is adversa-
rial and the judge has less discretion to manage the case.
Lawyers of potential plaintiffs may conclude that in most
circumstances the English discovery procedures are likely to be
more helpful to them than the corresponding procedures in France
and Germany, but much will depend on the facts of the case, and
on the operation of the rule In Re Westinghouse Uranium Con-
tract. 213
The example of discovery procedures also illustrates how diffi-
cult it is likely to be to harmonize national procedural rules, since
any harmonization proposals are likely to encounter different major
premises about how court procedures should be organized. This is
emphatically not to suggest that harmonization is too difficult and
not worth attempting, but merely to warn against expecting quick
results if it is undertaken.
H. Tax Treatment of Damages Recovered and Compensation Paid
The tax treatment of damages recovered by a successful plain-
tiff in an antitrust claim in the Community is purely a question of
the national tax law applicable. Since there is no punitive element
in damages in Europe, the only important question which might
arise is whether the damages should be treated as income or as
compensation for loss or destruction of capital. If this question arose
under the applicable tax law, it would have to be determined by
the nature of the plaintiff's claim.
Compensation, unlike fines, appears to be fully deductible for
an unsuccessful defendant in all EEC member states for the same
reason; namely that there is no punitive element in damages for
antitrust infringements in Europe.
212. Id.
213. In Re Westinghouse Uranium Contract, 1978 A.C. 547.
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I. Possible Future Community Measures To Harmonize
National Law Rules on Private Actions
If vagueness on national laws on some or all of the subjects
listed above unduly discourages plaintiffs, or if the differences be-
tween the national laws of member states on those subjects prove to
be sufficiently large, it may be necessary to consider a Community
directive to bring about clearer and more uniform rules. Such a
directive could be adopted under article 87, which expressly con-
templates measures "to determine the relationship between na-
tional laws and the provisions contained in [Community antitrust
law] or adopted pursuant to this Article. '214 It can be seen from this
article that many if not all of the rules of national law referred to
have some "relationship" with Community antitrust laws or proce-
dural rules.
Such a measure could be adopted by a qualified majority of
the Council. A harmonization measure which did not fall under
article 87 (for example, because it was concerned only with na-
tional laws and not with their relationship with Community anti-
trust law) could be adopted by unanimous vote under article 100, if
it were considered that the national laws directly affected the estab-
lishment and functioning of the EEC, or under article 235. As there
is nothing in article 87 to limit the national laws which may be
"related" to Community antitrust law, it is submitted that a com-
prehensive harmonization directive could probably be adopted un-
der article 87, but of course this would depend on exactly what was
dealt with. In addition, regulations (as distinct from directives)
dealing with the questions of Community law discussed in this
Article might be thought useful.
If a measure to harmonize national rules on some or all of these
topics were thought desirable, it would be complex and difficult to
draft, particularly in connection with procedural matters. It would
not be easy to harmonize such national rules for some types of
private actions and not for others, or to integrate a harmonized rule
into different national bodies of law on procedure. The history of
the Convention on Judgements shows how difficult and slow the
drafting of even a desirable and essentially technical arrangement
can be.
214. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art 87.
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It is perhaps useful to say that there seems to be no possibility
of multiple damages being made available for breach of Commu-
nity antitrust law. Opinion in Europe is highly opposed to multiple
damages, and (except probably in Germany) opinion does not re-
gard infringements of EEC antitrust law as seriously as antitrust
violations are regarded in the United States. The reasons for a
harmonization measure, therefore, would be to: 1) clarify the law,
2) give uniform remedies throughout the Community, 3) minimize
the reasons for forum shopping, and 4) improve and rationalize the
enforcement of Community antitrust law by ensuring that the
Commission does not need to deal with cases which could, if the
law were clarified, be satisfactorily and more economically dealt
with by national courts. These are substantial reasons, but they do
not necessitate a top priority effort, nor would they result in a
major shift in enforcement activity away from the Commission, as
the possibility of treble damages would do.
However, even though treble damages are not likely to be
made available, if it were Community policy to promote private
suits, a Community directive to clarify the national law rules would
be needed. In the absence of such a directive, it may take a while
before private actions become a really effective element in overall
enforcement of Community antitrust law. But a relatively small
number of clear judgements from higher courts or from the Court
of Justice could transform the picture.
J. Importance of Private Claims for Infringements of
Community Antitrust Law
On the assumption that the view expressed here correctly states
the present law, it is to be expected that plaintiffs will soon make
much more use of their rights to sue for compensation (and, when
appropriate, for declarations and injunctions) in national courts
than they have done in the past. Indeed they have already begun to
do so. Of the eight national court cases cited at the beginning of this
Article, six date from 1979 or later. 215
A directive making it clear that actions for compensation,
declarations and injunctions could be brought in national courts,
and harmonizing national law remedies for breaches of Commu-
215. See supra notes 28-48 and accompanying text.
EEC COMPETITION ACTIONS
nity antitrust law, would substantially improve the general level of
compliance with Community antitrust law.
Private actions in which plaintiffs would ask national courts to
apply articles 85 and 86 would have several important effects on the
general level of enforcement of and compliance with those articles.
First, private actions provide an extra deterrent, heighten
awareness of Community antitrust laws and ensure greater respect
for them without using the Commission's or the national cartel
authorities' scarce manpower.
Second, private actions would ensure that simple cases were
dealt with without involving the Commission, and that the Com-
mission could confine itself to large, important or difficult cases, or
cases with multinational elements or requiring extensive investiga-
tion, or in which Community fines are appropriate, i.e. cases in
which private parties could not bring successful or appropriate
claims in national courts.
Third, since enterprises will know that they can be successfully
sued by competitors or customers, they will be more likely to re-
spect Community law than if the only risk came from possible fines
imposed by the Commission, which is known to have a very small
staff.
Fourth, the likelihood of having to pay compensation to com-
petitors or customers will be a risk sufficiently immediate to be in
the minds of a firm's lawyers and auditors. Auditors should treat
possible or probable claims for damages in the same way as any
other contingent liability. They certainly need to be aware of them
when carrying out normal audits. 216 In appropriate cases lawyers
and auditors will have a professional duty to warn their clients that
they are violating articles 85 and 86 and that they are likely to have
to pay compensation or to face injunctions as well as risking Com-
mission action.
Fifth, the risk of having to fight claims for compensation will
discourage firms from behavior the lawfulness of which is doubtful.
It would also discourage the practice of continuing with an obvious
violation until the Commission puts an end to it.
Decentralization of the enforcement of Community antitrust
law, as a result of frequent private claims in national courts, would
216. Temple Lang, Community Antitrust Law-Compliance and Enforcement, 18 COM-
MON MKT. L. REv. 335, 360-62 (1981).
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substantially alter the present practice and operation of the law,
and greatly improve compliance levels.
Indeed, if as seems likely, private claims in national courts
become common and widespread, a whole new era of much more
general and effective compliance and enforcement will come about,
since Community antitrust law will no longer be enforced only by
the Commission.
If it seems that there are many uncertainties and some unsatis-
factory features of the present situation, it must be remembered
that the era of private antitrust claims is only just beginning in the
Community. No doubt the law will be clarified and weaknesses will
be remedied, if necessary by Community legislation.
It seems likely that the need for protection against private
claims for damages will cause more corporations to notify the Com-
mission of their agreements and practices so as to obtain exemptions
or, if appropriate, negative clearances. Whether this will cause a
net increase in the Commission's workload is not clear, since there
will be a concomitant decrease in the number of cases dealt with by
the Commission. The Commission could try to solve any problem of
increasing workload by proposing a directive to harmonize national
laws and procedures in a way which would encourage plaintiffs to
bring claims in national courts rather than to the Commission, and
by adopting or proposing the adoption of group exemptions under
article 85(3) for less restrictive agreements.
